Predicting Problematic Approach Behavior Toward Politicians: Exploring the Potential Contributions of Control Theory by Cacialli, Douglas Owen
University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
Theses, Dissertations, and Student Research: 
Department of Psychology Psychology, Department of 
8-2010 
Predicting Problematic Approach Behavior Toward Politicians: 
Exploring the Potential Contributions of Control Theory 
Douglas Owen Cacialli 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, doug.cacialli@gmail.com 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/psychdiss 
 Part of the Clinical Psychology Commons, and the Psychiatry and Psychology Commons 
Cacialli, Douglas Owen, "Predicting Problematic Approach Behavior Toward Politicians: Exploring the 
Potential Contributions of Control Theory" (2010). Theses, Dissertations, and Student Research: 
Department of Psychology. 23. 
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/psychdiss/23 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Psychology, Department of at 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses, Dissertations, and 
Student Research: Department of Psychology by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of 
Nebraska - Lincoln. 
PREDICTING PROBLEMATIC APPROACH BEHAVIOR TOWARD POLITICIANS: 
EXPLORING THE POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF CONTROL THEORY 
 
by 
 
Douglas O. Cacialli 
 
A DISSERTATION 
 
Presented to the Faculty of  
The Graduate College at the University of Nebraska 
In Partial Fulfillment of Requirements 
For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
Major: Psychology 
 
Under the Supervision of Professor Mario J. Scalora 
 
Lincoln, Nebraska 
 
August 2010 
   
   
 
PREDICTING PROBLEMATIC APPROACH BEHAVIOR TOWARD POLITICIANS: 
EXPLORING THE POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF CONTROL THEORY 
Douglas O. Cacialli, Ph.D. 
University of Nebraska, 2010 
Advisor: Mario J. Scalora 
 The potential merits of Carver and Scheier's (1981) control theory in the 
prediction of targeted violence are reviewed and several novel indicators of risk that are 
consistent with this theory are suggested for study.  It was hypothesized that: (a) 
similarity between inappropriate contact with politicians and extremist group literature 
and writings; (b) the temporal proximity to violent or otherwise criminal actions and 
notable anniversaries of such groups; (c) detailed specification of a plan to engage in 
problematic approach behavior, and; (d) self-focus, will be significant predictors of 
problematic approach behavior.  A sample of 506 individuals who engaged in threatening 
or otherwise inappropriate contact toward members of the United States Congress was 
drawn from the case files of the United States Capitol Police. 
 Results of the present research indicated that detailed specification of a plan to 
engage in problematic approach behavior was strongly predictive of actually engaging in 
problematic approach.  Furthermore, high self-focus was significantly related to 
problematic approach between-persons, although within-person, higher-than-average 
self-focus showed no such relation.  Neither temporal proximity to notable acts of 
extremist violence nor similarity to known extremist group writings was found to be 
associated with problematic approach in this sample.
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 Violence targeted at high-profile government officials and notable celebrities, 
although statistically rare, has the potential to fundamentally disrupt our way of life.  The 
assassination of John F. Kennedy and attempted assassination of Ronald Regan 
irrevocably changed the United States of America.  The impact of similar violence 
targeted at individuals outside of the national spotlight also cannot be minimized.  
Theodore Kaczynski's campaign of bombings between 1978 and 1995 and the April 20
th
, 
1999 school shooting incident at Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado caused 
fear among the public on an unprecedented scale.  Regardless of how rarely they occur, 
the dramatic and far-reaching effects of such violent incidents justify intense efforts 
toward their prevention. 
 The United States Secret Service (USSS), perhaps one of the most well-known 
law enforcement agencies responsible for the prevention of so-called targeted violence, 
has played a vital role in the development and early implementation of techniques aimed 
at identifying and deterring potential perpetrators of violence toward the Presidents of the 
United States and their families, Presidential candidates, and visiting foreign dignitaries.  
These techniques, collectively known as threat assessment, have been continuously 
developed and increasingly applied since their entry into the public domain.  Evidence of 
this growth can be observed in the application of threat assessment for originally 
unintended purposes (e.g., school-based threat assessment) as well as the annual increase 
in membership of the Association of Threat Assessment Professionals (ATAP). 
 Despite continued development of the threat assessment approach, theoretically-
based research on the phenomenon of targeted violence is strikingly limited.  The 
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premises and guiding principles of threat assessment stop short of helping us comprehend 
the reasons why a particular individual pursues a violent course of action when so many 
others, especially those in similar circumstances, do not.  A better understanding of this 
fundamental question would undoubtedly have major implications for the assessment of 
targeted violence and its prevention. 
 This dissertation is presented in the context of over ten years of largely 
atheoretical research on the phenomenon of targeted violence, including its prediction 
and management.  The purpose of this manuscript is two-fold.  First, threat assessment 
will be described and research pertinent to this approach and the phenomenon of targeted 
violence will be critically reviewed.  Second, the potential utility of applying 
psychological theory to targeted violence in improving the understanding, prediction, and 
management of this phenomenon will be briefly discussed. 
An Overview of the State-of-the-Art of Threat Assessment Techniques and Research 
Overview and Development of the Threat Assessment Approach 
 The investigative and operational techniques that are collectively known as threat 
assessment were widely disseminated through a National Institute of Justice (NIJ) 
Research in Action bulletin entitled Threat Assessment: An Approach to Prevent Targeted 
Violence (Fein, Vossekuil, & Holden, 1995).  Since the publication of this work, the term 
threat assessment has been used to refer to a number of activities, some of which have no 
bearing on the construct advanced in the NIJ publication.  By way of example, in 1999 
the journal Behavioral Sciences and the Law published a special issue, edited by Charles 
Patrick Ewing (Ewing, 1999), on the topic of threat assessment.  Many of the articles 
contained within this issue were authored by pioneering researchers in this field and were 
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directly relevant to the designated topic (e.g., Borum, Fein, Vossekuil & Berglund, 1999), 
however the issue also included articles promoting the utility of so-called “offender 
profiling” (Salfati & Canter, 1999) and the prediction of non-targeted institutional 
violence (Wang & Diamond, 1999).  The topics addressed in these latter articles, 
although potentially useful in their own right, are antithetical to certain assumptions 
underlying the threat assessment approach, such as the belief that there is no single 
profile of individuals who engage in targeted violence.  In order to provide a concise 
summary of the applicable literature, only research pertaining to targeted violence and 
threat assessment as defined by Fein et al. (1995) will be addressed herein.  Targeted 
violence henceforth refers to “situations in which an identifiable (or potentially 
identifiable) perpetrator poses (or may pose) a threat of violence to a particular individual 
or group” (Fein et al., 1995, p. 1).  Likewise, threat assessment henceforth refers to “the 
set of investigative and operational techniques that can be used by law enforcement 
professionals to identify, assess, and manage the risks of targeted violence and its 
potential perpetrators” (Fein et al., 1995, p. 2). 
 A number of circumstances in the 1990's, including new stalking legislation and 
widely-publicized acts of violence that occurred in schools and the workplace, have been 
cited by Borum et al. (1999) as having provided an impetus to develop strategies and 
techniques to prevent targeted violence perpetrated by potentially identifiable individuals.  
Although a great deal of research had been conducted with regard to assessing the risk of 
general violence and violent recidivism (see Quinsey, Harris, Rice, & Cormier, 2006 for 
an excellent review on this topic), unique characteristics of targeted violence proved 
problematic in applying prior findings and research methodologies to this issue.  For 
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example, Monahan's (1981) widely-accepted recommendation that clinicians base their 
assessments of violence risk upon base rates of actuarial risk factors was largely rendered 
moot by the relatively low base rates of targeted violence.  Furthermore, Melton, Petrila, 
Poythress, and Slobogin (1997) have noted that guided clinical judgment was the 
predominant method for conducting assessments of violence risk, and some would argue 
that it remains so today.  The research base pertaining to targeted violence that would be 
necessary to implement such an approach, however, has lagged far behind the research 
base pertaining to general violence and violent recidivism, a literature which has 
questionable generalizability to the prediction of targeted acts of violence (Fein & 
Vossekuil, 1998).  For example, a great deal of literature has highlighted the relationship 
between impulsivity and general violence and violent recidivism risk (e.g., Serin, 1991; 
Wang & Diamond, 1999).  The great deal of planning and preparation that often precedes 
acts of targeted violence and problematic approach run contrary to prior findings 
pertaining to impulsivity, and has led researchers to conceptualize targeted violence as a 
unique form of violent behavior.   Threat assessment was developed, in part, to address 
these limitations and shortcomings. 
 The threat assessment approach is based upon three fundamental principles 
(Borum et al., 1999; Fein & Vossekuil, 1998).  First, targeted violence is conceptualized 
as the end result of an understandable process of thinking and behaviors.  The 
demographic and psychological characteristics central in profiling-based approaches to 
the identification of potential perpetrators of targeted violence are de-emphasized in favor 
of thoughts and behaviors consistent with future violence toward an identifiable target or 
targets.  Second, targeted violence is understood as resulting from an interaction among 
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three distinct factors: the perpetrator of the violent act(s), a stimulus or “triggering 
condition” (Fein et al., 1995, p. 3) that leads the perpetrator to view violence as a solution 
to some problem or concern, and environmental characteristics that facilitate the violent 
act.  Third, the planning and preparation in which the potential perpetrator engages 
necessarily results in discrete, observable behaviors that evince his or her intention to 
engage in targeted violent action.  The identification of these behaviors is key to the 
assessment and management of potential perpetrators. 
 As stated above, the purpose of threat assessment is to identify potential 
perpetrators of targeted violence, as well as to assess and manage the risks of such 
violence.  Fein and colleagues (1995) discussed each of these three functions in greater 
detail.  With regard to the identification of potential perpetrators of targeted violence, the 
authors enumerate four important components: (a) the development of criteria that would 
trigger the initiation of a threat assessment investigation; (b) the identification of 
individuals or groups within an organization who are responsible for receiving 
information and conducting investigations; (c) the notification of organizations and 
individuals that may have direct contact with potential perpetrators that a threat 
assessment program is in existence, and; (d) dissemination of the criteria that would 
trigger a threat assessment investigation to those organizations and individuals.  Although 
the discipline of psychology may be useful in the development of such criteria, the 
components listed above are largely within the purview of those law enforcement 
agencies and security organizations responsible for conducting threat assessment 
activities. 
 The second purpose of threat assessment investigations, the assessment of 
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potential perpetrators and risks of targeted violence, has received the overwhelming 
majority of attention from researchers in law enforcement and psychology.  Fein et al. 
(1995) distinguished between investigative and evaluative functions as two component 
tasks in this type of assessment.  In investigating potential perpetrators, the importance of 
collecting information from multiple sources is stressed, as is the collection of 
information related to the behaviors that brought the subject to attention.  The potential 
relevance of recent stressful experiences and the subject's ability to cope with those 
stressors are also emphasized, as well as attack-consistent behaviors including expressed 
interests in possible targets, communications directed toward or in reference to potential 
targets, attempts to harm one's self or others, weapons procurement and usage, and 
stalking behaviors.  With regard to the evaluative function of threat assessment, Fein and 
colleagues (1995) suggest a two-stage process in which information is first evaluated to 
determine whether attack-consistent behaviors are present, followed by an evaluation to 
determine whether the potential perpetrator is “moving toward or away from an attack” 
(Fein et al., 1995, p. 5).  Those authors suggested a number of questions to be utilized in 
making the latter determination, including: 
1. Does it appear more or less likely that violent action will be directed by the 
subject against the target(s)?  What specific information and reasoning lead to this 
conclusion? (p. 5) 
2. How close is the subject to attempting an attack?  What thresholds, if any, have 
been crossed (e.g., has the subject violated court orders, made a will, given away 
personal items, expressed willingness to die or to be incarcerated)? (p. 5) 
3. What might change in the subject's life to increase or decrease the risk of 
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violence? What might change in the target's situation to increase or decrease the 
risk of violence? (p. 5) 
 The final purpose of the threat assessment investigation as outlined by Fein and 
colleagues (1995) is management and reduction of the risk of targeted violence.  This has 
been conceptualized as consisting of three discrete components: (a) the development of a 
plan to manage the potential perpetrator and the risk posed by the individual; (b) 
implementation of this plan, and; (c) making the determination that the potential 
perpetrator no longer poses a heightened risk of violence. 
 Although threat assessment as advanced by Fein and his colleagues (1995, 1998) 
and Borum et al. (1999) was novel both in the conceptualization of targeted violence and 
the techniques used to assess and manage it, their approach was based largely on the 
findings of three prior ground-breaking studies of targeted violence and attempts by 
individuals to come within close physical proximity to notable public figures where 
physical attacks are most likely to occur.  Park Dietz and his colleagues published the 
first two of these studies, separately examining threatening and otherwise inappropriate 
letters to Hollywood celebrities (Dietz, Matthews, Van Duyne, et al., 1991) and members 
of the United States Congress (Dietz, Matthews, Martell, et al., 1991).  Verbal and written 
communications such as those studied by Dietz and his colleagues are useful in that they 
offer what is arguably the best means available to threat assessment professionals to 
ascertain the thinking and motivations of the author as well as the first indication that a 
threat may be present.  The authors of these studies drew many operationally-relevant 
conclusions from their examination of correspondence characteristics in the cases 
examined.  For example, in letters written to Hollywood celebrities, the presence of a 
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communicated threat was shown to be unrelated to subsequent approach behavior.  In 
letters written to members of the Congress, the presence of a communicated threat was 
found to be associated with lower levels of approach behaviors than among those whose 
did not make a threat.  These findings, as well as those of Fein and Vossekuil (1999) 
showing that none of the subjects studied had communicated a threat about their target to 
the target or to law enforcement prior to their approach, appear to provide the empirical 
basis for the widely-accepted tenet in threat assessment that “those who pose threats 
frequently do not make threats” (Fein & Vossekuil, 1998, p. 14) and support deviation 
from the traditional reliance upon threats as a threshold for risk assessment. 
 Although a complete account of the conclusions of Dietz and his colleagues is 
beyond the scope of this review, a number of findings seem especially worth noting.  
Individuals who approached sent a greater number of letters, were more likely to attempt 
to make contact via the telephone, and more often expressed a desire for face-to-face 
contact; these factors held true whether the target was a member of Congress or a 
Hollywood celebrity.  Subjects who provided some indication of having constructed a 
plan of action (e.g., providing a time, date, or place that an approach would occur) also 
appeared more likely to approach, although the low numbers of such cases in the study of 
contacts toward members of Congress precluded statistical significance.  A number of 
factors was found to differentially predict approach between celebrities and members of 
Congress.   Evidence of transience among the authors of letters to Hollywood celebrities 
was related to an increased likelihood of approach, whereas this was not the case for 
authors of letters to members of Congress.  Among letters to this latter group, however, 
characterization of the congressional recipient as a benefactor, potential benefactor, 
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rescuer, or an attempt to elicit help from the congressperson, was associated with higher 
rates of approach; this was not the case among letters to celebrities. 
 Research conducted by Fein and Vossekuil (1999) also played an important role in 
the development of threat assessment techniques.  Touted as a departure from prior 
research on assassination which either examined the psychological and demographic 
characteristics of individuals who had never come close to successfully attacking a target 
(e.g., Logan, Reuterfors, Bohn, & Clark, 1984) or did not contribute to an understanding 
of risk factors for potential violence (e.g., Hoffman, 1943; Sebastiani & Foy, 1965), the 
authors reported upon the findings of the USSS Exceptional Case Study Project (ECSP), 
a study of the behaviors and reported thoughts of 83 individuals who attacked or 
approached with the intention of attacking USSS protectees, as well as major federal 
officials, notable government officials below the federal level, celebrities, and leaders of 
industry and commerce.  This sample was purported to represent all individuals known to 
have attacked or approached to attack these so-called “prominent persons of public 
status” in the United States since 1949.  The stated purpose of this research was to 
“gather and analyze information that Secret Service agents and other law enforcement 
professionals could use to prevent attacks on public officials and figures” (Fein & 
Vossekuil, 1999, p. 322). 
 Fein and Vossekuil (1999) reported that among individuals studied in the ECSP, 
there was no single profile or consistent demographic or psychological feature of the 
individual who engages in attack-related behavior, underscoring the futility of a profiling-
based approach to the prevention of targeted violence.  There were, however, 
commonalities of note.  Although ECSP subjects voiced a variety of reasons for their 
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attack, their reasons comprised eight discrete motives: (a) to achieve notoriety or fame, 
(b) to avenge a perceived wrong, (c) to end personal pain, often through their death by 
law enforcement or members of a protective detail, (d) to bring national attention to a 
perceived problem, (e) to save the country or world, (f) to achieve a special relationship 
with the target, (g) to make money, and (h) to bring about political change.  The authors 
noted that even subjects who suffered from mental illness often had motives that were 
rational when considering the sometimes delusional nature of their beliefs.  The 
importance of these motives cannot be ignored, as Fein and Vossekuil (1999) reported 
that targets and actions often varied as a function of the attacker‟s motive.  For example, 
subjects whose stated desire was to be killed by law enforcement were more likely to 
select a well-protected target such as the President of the United States.  Notably, targets 
and actions were also noted to vary according to found or perceived opportunities to 
attack.  Additional findings of the ECSP can be found in Table 1. 
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Table 1 
Major findings of the United States Secret Service Exceptional Case Study Project 
 
 Wide range in ages of subjects (16 years of age – 73 years of age) 
 Approximately half of subjects had attained college or graduate education 
 Approximately two-thirds of subjects were characterized as “social isolates” 
 Subjects often had a history of transience and mobility 
 Subjects often had a history of harassment of others 
 Subjects often had a history of demonstrating “explosive, angry behavior,” although 
only half of subjects had previously engaged in violent behavior 
 Subjects often had a history of weapons use, despite often having had no formal 
training 
 Subjects often demonstrated interests in “militant / radical ideas and groups,” despite 
not being members of such groups at the time of attack or approach 
 Subjects often demonstrated depression, despair, and suicidal ideation or attempts 
prior to or during the attack or approach 
 Subjects often received mental health care prior to their attack or approach, although 
few revealed their intention to attack to mental health care professionals 
 Subjects rarely demonstrated command hallucinations or substance use problems 
prior to the attack or approach 
 Subjects rarely had histories of arrest for violent crimes or crimes involving weapons, 
and rarely had been incarcerated in state or federal prisons 
12 
Current Directions in Threat Assessment Research 
 The empirical findings reported by Park Dietz ( Dietz, Matthews, Martell, et al., 
1991; Dietz, Matthews, Van Duyne, et al., 1991) and the USSS (Fein & Vossekuil, 1999) 
spurred the development of the threat assessment approach.  Since the publication of 
those studies a great deal of empirical research examining inappropriate communications 
with individuals in the public spotlight, as well as problematic approach behavior and 
targeted violence, has been conducted.  The overwhelming majority of this work has 
pertained to two applications: (a) the assessment and management of targeted violence 
risk and problematic approach toward celebrities and high-ranking government officials, 
and; (b) the assessment and management of targeted violence risk in schools.  Although 
threat assessment has recognized applications in the prevention and management of 
workplace violence (Turner & Gelles, 2003) and relationship stalking (Palarea, Zona, 
Lane, & Langhinrichsen-Rohling, 1999), research pertaining to the application of threat 
assessment to these issues has been far more limited.  In an effort to provide a concise 
review of the pertinent literature, research pertaining to these latter applications has been 
omitted from review. 
 Research pertaining to the assessment and management of targeted violence and 
problematic approach toward celebrities and high-ranking government officials. 
 Although the research of Fredrick Calhoun and the United Stated Marshals 
Service (USMS; Calhoun, 1998), the organization responsible for protection of the 
federal judiciary, began prior to the wide dissemination of threat assessment techniques 
by Fein and his colleagues (1995), Calhoun's findings are relevant to the assessment of 
targeted violence and understanding the relationship of threats made to threats posed.  
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Although a number of articles published in The Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science discussed the problem of targeted violence toward judicial 
officials (Jenkins, 2001; Vossekuil, Borum, Fein, & Reddy, 2001), the work of Calhoun 
(1998) is the only known work to provide empirical research findings.  Given that 
Calhoun (1998) based his research methodology on that of the 1991 research studies of 
Dietz and his colleagues (Dietz, Matthews, Martell, et al., 1991; Dietz, Matthews, Van 
Duyne, et al., 1991) (Calhoun, 2001), the relevancy of his findings to the threat 
assessment approach is not surprising.  Three-thousand and ninety-six inappropriate 
communications sent to federal jurists between 1980 and 1993 were examined.  These 
included threats made toward judicial officials, as well as communications characterized 
by additional criteria listed in Table 2 that prior work (e.g., de Becker, 1998; Dietz, 
Matthews, Martell, et al., 1991) has shown to be related to problematic approach 
behavior.  Contacts were assembled and classified according to the nature of the language 
used in the communication, allowing the author to examine the relationship between the 
language used and subsequent approach behavior.
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Table 2 
United States Marshals Service criteria for referral of inappropriate communications 
 
 A particular complaint or sense of outrage over the handling of a court case. 
 Pseudo-legal court filings. 
 References to a special history of special destiny shared with the judicial official. 
 Evidence of suspicious behavior, stalking behavior, or research on the personal affairs 
of the judicial official. 
 Religious and historical themes involving the judicial official (including 
admonishments for the judicial official to change lifestyles or personal behaviors). 
 References to death, suicide, weapons, violence, assassinations, acts of terrorism, or 
war. 
 Extreme or obsessive admiration or affection. 
 Obsessive desire to contact the judicial official (including plans for meetings, interest 
in home address or other personal information, surveillance, or following). 
 Belief that a debt is owed to the person by the judicial official (not necessarily money, 
but any kind of debt). 
 Perception of the judicial official as someone other than himself / herself (an 
impostor, a historical figure, the suspect's relative, God, or the devil). 
 References to public figures who have been attacked (Lincoln, Lennon, Sadat, 
Kennedy, Judge Vance, etc.). 
 Reference to individuals (or their acts) who have attacked public figures or committed 
notorious acts of violence or terrorism (Timothy McVeigh, Oswald, Hinckley, Sirhan 
Sirhan). 
15 
 Reference or claims of mental illness, such as psychiatric care, anti-psychotic 
medication, etc. 
 References to body guards, security, safety, danger, etc. 
16 
 
 There were a number of notable findings from Calhoun's (1998) research.  
Consistent with findings from the ECSP (Fein & Vossekuil, 1999), violence and 
attempted violence toward the federal judiciary varied as a function of the motives 
expressed by the perpetrator.  The motives associated with approach differed, however, 
from those found to be related to near-lethal or lethal approach of USSS protectees and 
notable public figures.  Amongst individuals engaging in problematic approach behavior 
and violence toward members of the federal judiciary, motives tied directly to the federal 
jurist as well as ideological motives that appeared unrelated to a specific case were 
predictive of problematic approach behavior and violent outcomes.  Additional factors 
that were found to be predictive of problematic approach behavior and violent outcomes 
included attempts to obscure one's identify, having known accomplices, and having 
affiliated with a group or ideological cause.  Of particular note, Calhoun (1998) reported 
that the method of communication delivery (e.g., written, telephone, face-to-face verbal) 
was highly related to case outcomes, such that delivery methods requiring close physical 
proximity to the target were more likely to result in violent or enhanced risk outcomes.  
This finding underscores the importance of examining approach behavior as a proxy for 
violent behavior and justifies its use as a relevant operational variable in its own right.  
Indeed, federal law enforcement agencies, such as the United States Capitol Police 
(USCP), have been noted to use approach behavior as a proxy for actual violent behavior 
(Scalora & Callaway, 2000). 
 Early research examining targeted threats posed to political officials was solely 
focused upon members of the federal government.  This research broadened our 
17 
understanding of threats and inappropriate communication directed toward the President 
of the United States (Fein & Vossekuil, 1999), members of the United States Congress 
(Dietz, Matthews, Martell, et al., 1991), and the federal judiciary (Calhoun, 1998), yet 
research examining this phenomenon at the level of state government was lacking despite 
Fein and Vossekuil's (1998) efforts to promote threat assessment among local and state 
law enforcement officials.  Baumgartner, Scalora, and Plank (2001) were the first to 
conduct such research, examining characteristics of threats and problematic approach 
behavior toward state government targets, including the capitol, governor, legislators, 
agency directors, and staff, in the state of Nebraska.  Using a representative sample of 46 
subjects responsible for 169 incidents occurring between 1987 and 1998, the authors 
reported a number of significant findings that largely mirrored those reported at the 
federal level.  Nearly equivalent percentages of individuals that Baumgartner et al. (2001) 
termed “approachers” and “non-approachers” had a documented history of involvement 
in the criminal justice system (29% v. 18.8%, among approachers and non-approachers 
respectively) or a known history of unwanted pursuit behavior (7.1% v. 9.4%, 
respectively), again highlighting the problem inherent to the application of risk factors for 
general violence in the assessment of targeted violence and problematic approach 
behavior.  Also consistent with prior findings, the use of threatening statements was not 
significantly predictive of subsequent approach behavior.  In contrast, however, to earlier 
findings suggesting that the duration of contact was unrelated to approach status (Dietz, 
Matthews, Martell, et al., 1991), Baumgartner et al. (1991) reported that approachers had 
a significantly longer duration of contact than non-approachers (222.4 days v. 90.1 days, 
respectively) and significantly longer intervals between contacts (106 days v. 25 days, 
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respectively), leading the authors to speculate that “the motivation to make contact was a 
more pervasive and persistent experience among approachers than among non-
approachers” (p. 55).  The authors also reported that while the frequency with which 
certain topics and motives, such as child custody (21.4% v. 3.1, respectively) and political 
or government issues (0.0% v. 25.0%, respectively) were voiced differed significantly 
between approachers and non-approachers, these motives differed from motives 
identified in prior research. 
 Scalora, Baumgartner, and Plank (2003) continued their examination of 
threatening and otherwise inappropriate contact and approach behavior at the state 
government level with a focus on the role of mental illness in such behavior.  The 
literature pertaining to mental illness among those who engage in inappropriate contact or 
problematic approach had not yielded a consistent finding in this regard.  Dietz, 
Matthews, Martell, et al. (1991) did not directly address the role of mental illness among 
the subjects they studied, although with regard to the relationships these individuals 
perceived sharing with members of Congress they stated that “… most of the role 
relationships perceived by subjects were obviously the product of mental disorder, often 
delusions” (p. 1456).  In a later review of threats made against the President of the United 
States, Coggins, Steadman, and Veysey (1996) reported that approximately 50% of 
individuals issuing such threats had previously received mental health care and that 
approximately 90% of those believed to pose a legitimate threat had a history of mental 
health treatment.  Fein and Vossekuil (1999) reported that among lethal and near-lethal 
approachers comprising the ECSP sample, 61% had been evaluated or treated by a mental 
health professional at some point in their lifetime, although 75% of attackers were not 
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delusional at the time of attack.  In their sample of 56 individuals with mental illness and 
71 individuals without mental illness, Scalora et al. (2003) found that individuals with 
mental illness engaged in more frequent contact, more frequently issued demands, and 
were more likely to display help-seeking and religious themes.  Individuals with mental 
illness were notably less likely to display insulting or degrading content in their contacts.  
Although the authors did not find any difference between the groups studied with regard 
to approach or attempted approach behavior, it is notable that the variables upon which 
subjects with mental illness were noted to have differed have been previously found to 
differentially predict approach behavior. 
 Research conducted by David James and his colleagues (2007) demonstrated that 
the mental illness is a contributing factor to targeted violence against European political 
figures as well as political figures in the United States.  In their study of 24 attacks 
occurring between 1990 and 2004, they found that ten attackers were psychotic at the 
time the incident took place.  While pre-attack warning behaviors were identified in only 
11 of the incidents, the authors of this study reported that most of individuals identified as 
suffering from a mental disorder gave some warning, and that these same individuals 
were responsible for most of the 12 attacks resulting in serious or fatal injuries.  These 
findings truly emphasize the importance of understanding the role mental illness plays in 
targeted violence and problematic approach behavior. 
 The role of mental illness in problematic approach behavior and targeted violence 
was more recently examined by James and colleagues (2008).  Subject characteristics of 
the 23 persons known to have individually attacked a member of the British royal family 
between 1778 and 1994 were analyzed with an emphasis on: (a) the target, and the harm 
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inflicted; (b) where and how the attacks occurred; (c) the nature of prior warnings or 
stalking behaviors, if any; (d) the attacker‟s motivation; (e) the attacker‟s psychiatric 
history and mental state at the time, and (f) the outcome for the attacker.  It should be 
noted that although this study resembles the ECSP in that both examine attack behavior 
toward some of the most notable individuals in the United States and Great Britain, some 
of the attacks examined by James et al. (2008) were not likely to result in critical injury 
(e.g., the throwing of a wet, black t-shirt at Queen Elizabeth II on February 6
th
, 1990).  
Approximately half of individuals used a firearm in their commission of their attack, a 
percentage far lower than the 81% of ECSP subjects who possessed a handgun, rifle, or 
shotgun at the time of their lethal or near-lethal approach (Fein & Vossekuil, 1999).  In 
further contrast to the findings of the ECSP, 48% of attackers were determined to be 
delusional or experiencing auditory or visual hallucinations at the time of their attack and 
an additional 17% had histories of mental illness, although no evidence pertaining to their 
psychiatric state at the time of their attack was available.  Ten subjects engaged in contact 
behavior prior to their attack or voiced their intentions to attack to others. 
 Most recently, the role of mental illness in problematic approach and harassing 
behaviors targeting political figures was studied among members of Parliament and the 
legislative assemblies in Canada.  Adams, Hazelwood, Pitre, Bedard, and Landry (2009) 
surveyed Canadian Federal and Provincial politicians in office during March 1998 
regarding their experience with harassment perpetrated by individuals believed to be 
suffering from a mental disorder.  Of the 424 politicians that responded to the survey 
(approximately 40% of those contacted), 30% reported experiencing harassment and 87% 
believed that the perpetrator of the harassment may have suffered from a mental illness.  
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Although the generalizability of these findings to the issue of targeted violence are 
potentially affected by the self-selection of participants, lack of objective evidence of 
mental illness among perpetrators, and use of harassment as the behavior of interest, this 
study does suggest that mental illness may play a significant role in the difficulties 
Canadian politicians encounter with problematic approach and other inappropriate 
behaviors. 
 Although Dietz, Matthews, and Martell et al.'s (1991) study of problematic 
contact toward members of the United States Congress significantly deepened our 
understanding of factors related to problematic approach toward these government 
officials, their sample of 86 cases was relatively small, even when compared to the 
sample of 214 cases used by Dietz, Matthews, and Van Duyne et al. (1991) in their study 
of problematic contacts toward Hollywood celebrities.  Scalora et al. (2002a) redressed 
this issue in their study of 4,387 cases involving threatening and otherwise problematic 
contact toward members of the United States Congress.  Consistent with prior research on 
this topic, the authors reported that subjects who engaged in approach behavior were 
significantly more likely to have engaged in multiple contact attempts toward a target, to 
be of younger age, and to have demonstrated symptoms of serious mental illness (e.g., 
delusional thinking, hallucinations).  Subjects who attempted to obscure their identity or 
issued a direct or veiled threat were significantly less likely to engage in approach 
behavior.  A number of motives were noted among the cases studied, and help-seeking 
was significantly associated with an increased risk of approach.  Interestingly, Scalora et 
al. (2002a) reported that subjects engaging in approach behavior were significantly more 
likely to have prior criminal records.  Although Dietz and his colleagues did not examine 
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the criminal histories of their subjects, findings from the ECSP (Fein & Vossekuil, 1999) 
suggest that individuals who engage in lethal and near-lethal approach behavior often 
have no criminal history.  It may certainly be the case, however, that subjects who 
approach with unknown intent differ in subtle, yet significant, ways from those who have 
attempted or successfully assassinated a notable public figure. 
 In a follow-up study published shortly following the aforementioned work of 
Scalora et al. (2002a), Scalora et al. (2002b) sought to assess the predictive value of a 
number of subject-related and contact behavior-related factors among a smaller sample of 
individuals heterogeneous with regard to their history of approach.  Once again, the 
authors reported a number of findings that were largely consistent with previously 
reported research findings.  Individuals engaging in approach behavior were more likely 
to have identified themselves prior to or during contacts and to have demonstrated 
symptoms of severe mental illness, and less likely to have issued threats prior to 
approach.  Consistent with Scalora et al.'s (2002a) prior findings, individuals engaging in 
approach behavior had significantly more prior criminal offenses across a number of 
crime categories (although prior threats and harassment charges notably failed to 
significantly differ between groups), and were more likely to have had contact with other 
federal law enforcement agencies.  Finally, individuals who engaged in approach 
behavior toward a Congressional member were more likely to employ multiple methods 
of contact prior to their approach and to articulate themes and content of a personal 
nature in those contacts. 
 The most recent research to examine the characteristics of threatening and 
inappropriate contacts and subsequent approach behavior was conducted by 
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Schoeneman-Morris, Scalora, Chang, Zimmerman, and Garner (2007).  Again using data 
collected with the USCP, the authors compared the contact and approach characteristics 
of individuals who engaged in contact via letter to individuals who did so via e-mail.  
They found significant differences between these groups.  Individuals who engaged in 
contact via letter were more likely to demonstrate symptoms consistent with serious 
mental illness, have a criminal history, write more, use multiple methods of contact, and 
mention multiple targets.   Individuals who wrote e-mails, on the other hand, were more 
likely to focus on government concerns and use obscene language in their contact.  Most 
notably, individuals who sent letters of a threatening or otherwise inappropriate nature to 
members of Congress were more likely to engage in problematic approach toward their 
target.  Schoeneman-Morris et al. (1997) were careful to note that many of the variables 
that distinguished letter-writers from e-mailers have been previously found to be related 
to an increased risk of problematic approach behavior, as can be seen from the literature 
reviewed above suggesting that letter writing, per se, is not predictive of approach 
behavior apart from other predictors. 
 Mullen and colleagues (Mullen et al., 2009) recently addressed the fixation upon 
and pursuit of public figures in their discussion of the various forms of pathological 
fixations and more normative forms of loyalty and admiration.  Based upon research 
undertaken for the UK Home Office, it is proposed that individuals who demonstrate 
pathological fixation may be conceptualized as belonging to one of five categories: 
relationship seekers, who believe they have or are destined to entered into a special 
relationship with the targeted individual; petitioners, who request or demand assistance 
for some cause or personal issue; pretenders, who assert a false claim to royalty or some 
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elevated position; persecuted, who believe they are being persecuted against by either the 
targeted individual or a third-party; and, chaotic, who demonstrate incoherent or 
disorganized behavior.  The authors noted that many individuals whose fixated behavior 
falls into one of these categories suffer from major mental illness, and that difficulty in 
understanding their motivation contributes to difficulty assessing their risk.  It is 
interesting to note that the typology forward by these authors is consistent with the 
motivations identified in the literature reviewed above; consider, for example, the 
similarity between the findings of Scalora et al. (2002a) regarding help-seeking 
motivations of individuals who engage in approach and the “petitioner” category. 
 Research pertaining to the assessment and management of targeted violence in 
schools. 
 The first peer-reviewed research regarding the application of threat assessment in 
a school setting to appear following the seminal works of Fein et al. (1995), Fein and 
Vossekuil (1998, 1999), and Borum et al. (1999) was conducted by Kim Ryan-Arredondo 
and her colleagues (Ryan-Arrendondo et al., 2001).  The article describes the process 
undertaken by the Dallas Independent School District (DISD) to develop the Dallas 
Violence Risk Assessment (DVRA) for use in evaluating the risk of targeted school 
violence and determining the most appropriate intervention given the details of the case.  
Each of the 18 individual items on the DVRA correspond to a violence risk factor 
selected based upon the extant school violence literature, although the influence of a 
checklist created by the National School Safety Center (NSSC; NSSC, 1998) consisting 
of purported characteristics of juveniles who had caused school-associated violent deaths, 
as well as research conducted by Kingery, Biafora, and Zimmerman (1996), appears 
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considerable.  The DVRA is scored by averaging item rankings (e.g., “Risk present, but 
lower” = 1; ” “Medium” = 2; “Higher” = 3) provided by school staff members, and the 
resulting score is the compared to predetermined score ranges corresponding to 
categories of risk (e.g., “Low,” “Medium,” “High”). 
 The efforts of the DISD in creating the DVRA, notable for their primacy, deviated 
heavily from the threat assessment approach and suffered from a number of 
methodological constraints limiting the generalizability and usefulness of their findings 
and the resulting measure.  The initiation of threat assessment procedures and 
administration of the DVRA occurred only following an explicit verbal or written threat 
made by a student.  Although threats should never be ignored, the threat assessment 
approach places an emphasis on the identification of individuals who pose threats, not 
simply those who make threats.  Furthermore, the emphasis on demographic and 
psychological characteristics of students in DVRA items, such as “Empathy, sympathy, or 
remorse” (p. 187) and “History of aggressive behavior” (p. 187), is inconsistent with the 
emphasis on attack-related thoughts and behaviors in the threat assessment approach.  It 
should also be noted that many of the DVRA items, such as “History of previous threats,” 
were selected for inclusion based upon their predictive utility for general violence, 
although as stated above, the unique characteristics of targeted violence have proved 
problematic in applying findings regarding predictors of general violence.   With regard 
to methodological limitations, the data presented by Ryan-Arrendondo et al. (2001) 
indicated that the overwhelming majority of students who were eventually charged with 
making a terroristic threat were not assessed using the DVRA leading the authors to 
conclude that DISD procedures regarding DVRA administration were not being followed.  
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Finally, the results of this research were descriptive in nature and the omission of a 
comparison group precluded assessment of the clinical utility of their approach in 
preventing targeted violence. 
 The fact that Ryan-Arrendondo et al.'s (2002) study suffered from a number of 
methodological shortcomings and deviated significantly from the threat assessment 
approach originally promulgated might have been expected given that there was no 
precedent for the use of threat assessment in a school setting and no prior research on 
which to build.  Several review articles had identified threat assessment as a potentially 
valuable tool in assessing violence risk among youth.  Borum (2000) briefly addressed 
threat assessment in his review of techniques for the assessment of violence risk among 
youth.  Reddy, Borum, Berglund, Vossekuil, Fein, and Modzeleski (2001) later discussed 
the relative merits of threat assessment in the school setting against other approaches 
such as profiling and automated decision-making.  And although Burns, Dean, and Jacob-
Timm (2001) incorrectly characterized threat assessment techniques as “actuarial … 
which [have] consistently been demonstrated to be more effective than a clinical 
approach” (p. 244), these authors also provided a favorable review.  It was not until 2002 
that researchers with the USSS and the United Stated Department of Education provided 
a research base and precedent for use with the publication of a guide to implementing 
threat assessment techniques in school settings (Fein et al., 2002).  This guide was a 
product of the Safe School Initiative (SSI), a project with the stated purpose of exploring 
“the potential for adapting the threat assessment investigative process developed by the 
Secret Service to the problem of targeted school violence” (Fein et al., 2002, p.4).  The 
research methodology underlying the SSI was based upon the earlier ECSP; the 
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characteristics of 37 incidents of targeted school violence known to have occurred in the 
United Stated between December 1974 and May 2000 were examined.  Both the sample 
size and time period examined exceeded that used in prior targeted school violence 
prevention research conducted by the Federal Bureau of Intelligence (FBI; O'Toole, 
2000), which examined the characteristics of 18 incidents of targeted school violence 
occurring between 1988 and 1998.  Remarkably, the results of Fein et al.'s (2002) study 
mirrored that of the ECSP in many ways: most attackers were found not to have 
threatened their targets directly, although attackers were found to have engaged in certain 
behaviors prior to the attack that were indicative of a high risk for targeted violence.  
Students engaged in violent action for a number of reasons, although these reasons 
generally corresponded to four motives: (a) revenge for a perceived injury or grievance; 
(b) yearning for attention, recognition, or notoriety; (c) a wish to solve a problem 
otherwise seen as unbearable, and; (d) a desire to die or be killed.  These motives are a 
subset of the motives Fein and Vossekuil (1999) identified as driving the lethal or near-
lethal actions of subjects in the ECSP.  The key findings of this study can be found in 
Table 3. 
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Table 3 
Key findings of the United States Secret Service Safe School Initiative 
 
 Incidents of targeted violence at school rarely are sudden, impulsive acts. 
 Prior to most incidents, other people know about the attacker's idea and / or plan to 
attack. 
 Most attackers did not threaten their targets directly prior to advancing their attack. 
 There is no accurate or useful 'profile' of students who engage in targeted school 
violence. 
 Most attackers engaged in some behavior, prior to the incident, that caused others 
concern or indicated a need for help. 
 Most attackers had difficulty coping with significant losses or personal failures.  
Many had considered suicide. 
 Many attackers felt bullied, persecuted, or injured by others prior to the attack. 
 Most attackers had access to and had used weapons prior to their attack. 
 In many cases, other students were involved in the attack in some capacity. 
 Despite prompt law enforcement responses, most attacks were stopped by means 
other than law enforcement intervention and most were brief in duration. 
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 Although the research underlying the SSI was patterned after the ECSP, the 
resulting guide authored by Fein et al. (2002) differed considerably from Fein and 
Vossekuil's (1998) guide for state and local law enforcement officials, as well as their 
1999 article outlining the findings of the ECSP.  This difference is most notable in the 
concrete nature of recommendations made regarding the creation of a safe school climate 
and the identification, evaluation, and management of students who may pose a 
heightened risk of targeted violence.  Fein et al.'s (2002) guide was designed for use by 
law enforcement officials as well as school administrators, the latter group being less 
likely to possess the prerequisite skill-set to successfully implement a threat assessment 
program, a possible explanation for this difference.  In their development of school threat 
assessment guidelines, Cornell et al. (2004) note that: 
It was recognized that an elaborate process of threat assessment would be 
burdensome to school authorities and that it would be necessary to design an 
efficient process to design an efficient process to distinguish the commonplace 
threats … from the more serious threats … (p. 531) 
It is, perhaps, this recognition which explains why much of the psychological literature 
pertaining to the prevention of targeted school violence through the application of threat 
assessment has focused upon the dissemination of guidelines or directions in lieu of 
empirical research findings (e.g., Patrasso, 2005).  
 Fairly read, the existing empirical research examining targeted school violence 
and school threat assessment is not as well developed as that examining targeted violence 
and problematic approach toward notable public figures.  In a review published four 
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years following publication of the joint USSS – Department of Education guide, 
Randazzo et al. (2006) did not note any data-driven research pertaining to school-based 
threat assessment during that time.  Cornell (2003) and Cornell et al. (2004) describe the 
results of a demonstration project designed to field-test school threat assessment 
guidelines.  Although the authors cited seminal threat assessment literature, the approach 
utilized in this research appears to be synthesis of suggestions made by the FBI (O‟Toole, 
2000) and those outlined in Fein et al.‟s (2002) guide.  In some respects, the authors 
deviated significantly from the threat assessment as defined by originally defined by Fein 
and Vossekuil (1999) and Borum et al. (1999), such as the issuance of a threat as a 
threshold for initiation of threat assessment procedures (Cornell, 2003).  Student threats 
were monitored in 35 schools over the course of a single school year and a decision-tree 
model was implemented to evaluate the risk of targeted school violence, as well 
determine an appropriate response.  The authors reported that of the 188 reported threats, 
70% were deemed “transient threats,” or “statements that do not express a lasting intent 
to harm someone and can be resolved with an apology or an explanation” (Cornell et al., 
2004, p. 533) and 30% were deemed “substantive threats” that “represent a sustained 
intent to harm someone beyond the immediate situation where the threat was made” 
(Cornell et al., 2004, p. 533).  Substantive threats precipitated a more extensive 
evaluation by members of the threat assessment team; only three students were expelled 
and no acts of targeted violence as threatened were noted.  Although this implementation 
of a targeted school violence risk reduction program was successful in that no targeted 
violent action occurred, it is important to again note that targeted school violence is an 
extremely low base-rate behavior; probabilistically, one could expect no acts of targeted 
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violence even in the absence of a specialized program for its prevention.  Furthermore, in 
the absence of a control group, the clinical utility of the results of this study are unknown.  
Finally, this research, as well as other research conducted in an effort to understand 
targeted school violence, may have little generalizability to targeted school violence 
occurring on college and university campuses, such as the shooting deaths of 32 
individuals by Seung-Hui Cho on the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University 
campus on April 16, 2007. 
 Recent research by Allen, Cornell, Lorek, and Sheras (2008) is cause for optimism 
that when provided, threat assessment training for school personnel is effective.  These 
authors provide outcome data following a single day training program based upon the 
Guidelines for Responding to Student Threats of Violence (Cornell & Sheras, 2006), 
provided to approximately 350 individuals.  Although the preventative effects of this 
training on targeted school violence could not be assessed, data obtained through pre- and 
post-training surveys revealed that staff reported a significant decrease in concerns about 
school homicide and an increase in awareness of effective violence prevention efforts.  
Analyses also revealed that staff endorsement of violence prevention efforts that lack 
empirical support for their use, including zero tolerance and profiling approaches, 
decreased, and that knowledge of threat assessment principles and concepts was 
improved. 
 While Allen and colleagues (2008) examined changes in perceptions and beliefs 
among school staff following the dissemination of threat assessment training, Cornell, 
Sheras, Gregory, and Fan (2009) examined the beliefs of students attending schools in 
which threat assessment procedures or an alternative violence prevention strategy had 
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been implemented.  Compared to students attending schools in which local threat 
assessment procedures or a violence prevention strategy not based upon threat assessment 
principles was in effect, students attending schools utilizing the Guidelines for 
Responding to Student Threats of Violence (Cornell & Sheras, 2006) reported less 
bullying, a greater willingness to seek help, and more positive perceptions of the school 
climate.  Additionally, schools utilizing the approach designed by Cornell and Sheras 
(2006) have fewer long-term suspensions.  While violence prevention strategies were not 
randomly assigned, post-hoc analyses revealed that these differences were not attributable 
to school size, socioeconomic status of the student body, neighborhood violent crime, or 
the extent of physical security measures in the schools. 
The Potential Utility of Psychological Theory in Improving the Assessment and 
Management of Targeted Violence 
 Through research conducted since Fein et al.'s (1995) seminal publication, the 
knowledge base regarding assessment and management of targeted violence and 
problematic approach behavior has grown considerably.  A number of similarities can be 
noted across studies, regardless of the population studied.  The relationship between 
issuing a threat or using threatening language and engaging in problematic approach 
behavior is one of the most notable similarities observed, both with regard to the 
consistency with which it is observed and the implications for the threat assessment 
investigations.  Simply put, those who make a threat rarely pose a threat.  Perhaps just as 
notable with regard to consistency across studies is the role motivation plays in approach 
and attack behavior.  Whether conceptualized as motive (e.g.,  Fein & Vossekuil, 1999, 
James et al., 2008) or theme (e.g., Baumgartner, Scalora, & Plank, 2001; Dietz, 
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Matthews, Martell, et al., 1991), most studies conducted to date have emphasized the role 
an individual's motivation plays in the thinking and actions leading up to the approach.  
Another similarity emerged with respect to negative life events occurring in the weeks 
and months leading up to the attack.  Many researchers noted that subjects engaging in 
problematic approach and attack behavior often had histories or evidenced symptoms of 
mental illness, although it was frequently the case that subjects who attacked were not 
currently psychotic. 
 The equal importance of theory and solid research methodology in research 
conducted by the USSS was explicated by Coggins, Pynchon, and Dvoskin (1998), who 
stated that the USSS Behavioral Research Program “strives to ensure that its study of 
specific issues is grounded in proper theoretical and empirical foundations and that its 
methods and findings adhere to the standards of scientific peer review” (p. 60).  
Regardless of how much has been learned with regard to the behaviors and thoughts of 
those who engage in acts of targeted violence, the threat assessment community, 
including psychologists and law enforcement personnel who develop and apply threat 
assessment techniques, has largely failed to develop a proper theoretical foundation in 
their research despite calls for such work.  In their article addressing violence against the 
federal judiciary, Weiner and Hardenbergh (2001) acknowledge the work of Calhoun 
(1998) and emphasize the multiple domains which must be considered when assessing an 
individual‟s risk of violence (e.g., psychological aspects of the individual, sociological 
aspects of the community or subject's in-group), an emphasis that is quite similar to 
Borum et al.'s (1999) focus on “a more situational / contextual understanding of risk” (p. 
329).  These authors explore the utility of theories based in environmental criminology 
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and rational-choice perspectives.  Weiner and Hardenbergh conclude, however, that “no 
systematic theory based on multiple perspectives, analytical levels, and methods has 
evolved that adequately explains the wide continuum of threats, approaches, and attacks 
against people sharing the common occupational designation and workplace of the 
judiciary” (p. 29).  In a later examination of individuals who stalk the President of the 
United States, Phillips (2006) noted that extant stalking typologies were not useful in 
understanding this specific type of stalking behavior. The author noted that stalking 
typologies evolve from the synthesis of empirical and theoretical accounts of stalking 
behavior, and given the high quality and quantity of empirical data collected by the USSS 
pertaining to individuals who stalk the President, it would seem that the lack of relevant 
theory is central to this issue.  
 In discussing the philosophical and theoretical foundations of acceptance and 
commitment therapy, Hayes, Strosahl, and Wilson (1999) stated: 
Descriptions of technique, devoid of underlying theory, have little to say about 
novel situations.  As a result, when new situations present themselves many 
clinicians simply throw old techniques at new problems just to see what happens. 
... For practical reasons we need to develop and use statements that have broad 
applicability, while maintaining a high level of precision. (p. 14) 
Although the authors of this passage were referring to the use of theory in a context 
entirely different from threat assessment, they could just as well have been referring to 
the development of these techniques.  Research pertaining to the relationship between 
motives and problematic approach behavior provides an effective illustration of this 
point.  Although motive and contact theme variables have uniformly been shown to be 
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related to problematic approach behavior, motives and themes have been found to vary as 
a function of the role of the target as reviewed above.  An atheoretical approach to the 
development of threat assessment techniques results in as many discrete findings 
regarding the contact themes and motives of individuals who approach or attack as there 
are target roles.  A theoretical approach, on the other hand, provides a systematic means 
by which to relate these findings to each other. 
 Control theory is one of many psychological theories that take an information-
processing approach to understanding human cognition and behavior.  In their seminal 
text, Carver and Scheier (1981) present research pertaining to this subject from the 
perspective that “attentional focus is an important determinant of people's perceptions 
and constructions of reality, that variations in attentional focus also have a major impact 
on people's actions, and that the consequences of attentional focus are best 
conceptualized in terms of the processing of information” (p. 4).  The assumptions 
underlying targeted violence and problematic approach behavior, when viewed from this 
perspective, run parallel to the assumptions of the threat assessment approach.  These 
parallel assumptions, outlined elsewhere in this section, provide the rationale for 
examining control theory to the exclusion of many other, potentially useful theoretical 
positions. 
 Although a comprehensive review of control theory is far beyond the scope of 
this manuscript, a number of central tenets must be understood in order to appreciate the 
potential relevance of this theory to the prediction and management of targeted violence.  
Carver and Scheier (1981) stress the importance of inwardly-directed versus outwardly-
directed attention as conceptualized by Duval and Wicklund (1972), as research has 
36 
demonstrated that behavior varies according to attentional focus when dichotomized in 
this manner.  Outwardly-directed attention, otherwise referred to as environment focus, 
can be characterized as the processing of information originating outside of one‟s body.  
Inwardly-directed attention, otherwise referred to as self-focus, plays an important role in 
the comparison between one‟s current state and one‟s goal state, or behavioral standard.  
These comparisons, in turn, motivate the individual to engage in behaviors that minimize 
the discrepancy between the current state and the goal.  Self-regulation through this 
mechanism serves as the basis for human behavior from the standpoint of a control 
theorist.  
Behavioral standards are presumed to exist at multiple levels, ranging 
hierarchically from very concrete (e.g., move fingers up and down in a typing motion) to 
very abstract (e.g., complete requirements for doctoral candidacy).  Powers (1973) 
posited a framework that has been adopted by Carver and Scheier (1981) to illustrate this 
hierarchy.  For the current purposes, a conceptual understanding of the three most 
abstract levels of the hierarchy, the Principle, Program, and Sequence levels, is of 
particular importance.  Standards at the Principle level constitute the most general goals 
serving to guide an individual's behavior.  Within the context of problematic approach 
behavior toward politicians, standards at the Principle level are largely synonymous with 
what has heretofore been referred to as motives (e.g., achieving notoriety or fame, 
achieving a special relationship with the politician). As they are the most abstract of all 
behavioral standards, they can be achieved through a variety of actions.  By way of 
fictional example, an individual who has as his goal to bring attention to a suspected 
clandestine, illegal spy satellite program may achieve this goal in a number of ways, 
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including the dissemination of this information to media outlets, activism and protest in a 
crowded public venue, or the assassination of a high-ranking federal government official, 
as Sirhan Sirhan did when he assassinated Robert F. Kennedy in an ostensible attempt to 
bring attention to the plight of the Palestinian people. These various actions represent 
behavioral standards at the Program level and are the means by which this individual may 
achieve his behavioral standard at the Principle level (e.g., bring attention to an illegal 
spy satellite program).  It is important to recognize that behavioral standards at the 
Program level can also be conceptualized as goals, albeit more concrete in nature than 
goals at the Principle level.  And just as possible behavioral standards at the Program 
level constitute means by which to achieve the behavioral standard at the higher Principle 
level, behavioral standards at the Sequence level constitute means by which to achieve 
the behavioral standard at the higher Program level.  In keeping with the previous 
example, let us suppose that the individual has selected the assassination of a high-
ranking official in the federal government as the best means by which to bring attention 
to the spy satellite program.  He may achieve this goal by traveling to the Russell Senate 
Office Building in Washington, D.C., visiting traveling the White House, or traveling to 
the district offices of a notable Congressional member.  Regardless of the hierarchical 
level, behavior is generally aimed at the reduction or negation of any perceived 
discrepancy between an individual's current state and the relevant behavioral standard, 
such as in the action of a negative feedback loop.  Figure 1 provides a graphical 
representation of this example in toto.
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Figure 1 
Application of Powers (1973) hierarchy of behavioral standards to a fictional instance of 
problematic approach behavior toward a member of the United States Senate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PRINCIPLE: Bring attention to a 
suspected secret, illegal spy satellite 
program developed by the government 
PROGRAM: Assassinate a high-ranking 
member of the United States Senate 
SEQUENCE: Travel to the Russell 
Senate Office Building in Washington, 
D.C. 
 
RELATIONSHIP: Drive automobile to 
Washington, D.C. 
TRANSITION: Steering and operation 
of the automobile controls 
CONFIGURATION: Hand clasped on 
the steering wheel of the automobile 
SENSATION: Grasping the steering 
wheel 
INTENSITY: Muscle tension in hands Behavioral effect 
Analysis of 
perceived 
behavioral effect 
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 There are several points that must be considered in order to understand the 
strengths and weaknesses of a predictive model of targeted violence that is based upon 
control theory.  First, the relationship between behavioral standards and the likelihood of 
engaging in problematic approach behavior is likely to decrease as the standards become 
more concrete.  Returning again to the example provided above, exceedingly few 
individuals strive to bring attention to clandestine satellite programs which they believe 
are developed and operated by the federal government with the purpose of spying on 
United States citizens.  Given the small number of individuals who maintain such 
standards and the empirical research findings that suggest such motives have previously 
led individuals to engage in near-lethal approach behavior (Fein & Vossekuil, 1999), one 
might expect this behavioral standard to be highly predictive of problematic approach 
behavior.  Now consider the predictive utility of the behavioral standard at the Intensity 
level, the most concrete level in Powers (1973) hierarchy: muscle tension in the 
individual's hands.  Billions of people exhibit some degree of muscle tension in their 
hands each day, and it is reasonable to suspect that such muscle tension typically has no 
relationship with problematic approach behavior.  A second, related, point complicates 
this issue: the practical utility of behavioral standards in predicting targeted violence will 
likely decrease as the level of abstraction increases.  Although the behavioral standard at 
the Principle level may be highly related to problematic approach behavior, behavioral 
standards at this level can only be observed if explicated by the individual, such as in the 
context of a threatening or inappropriate communication.  Despite the strong relationship, 
the inability to accurately assess behavioral standards at this level largely renders moot 
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behavioral standards at the Principle and Programs levels for the purposes of threat 
assessment.  Behavioral standards at the Sequence level, on the other hand, are likened to 
“events” (Carver & Scheier, 1981, p. 68), and like behavioral standards at the 
Relationship level, are observable and potentially predictive. 
A final point that must be considered is that multiple behavioral standards exist at 
each level of abstraction.  In order to achieve the behavioral standard at the Program level 
in our fictional example, the assassination of a high-ranking member of the United States 
Senate, the individual must do more than simply travel to the Russell Senate Office 
Building in Washington, D.C.  He or she must also obtain weaponry, choose a Senator to 
attack, determine precisely where that Senator will be and at precisely what time.  Had 
the individual chose another behavioral standard at the Program level (e.g., activism and 
protest in a crowded public venue), an entirely different set of behavioral standards at the 
Sequence level might have applied (e.g., travel to a crowded public venue, the creation of 
picket signs, obtaining a bullhorn).  Simply put, behavioral complexity increases 
exponentially as behavioral standards become more concrete.  This complexity has 
another implication: the predictive utility of observable behavioral standards at the 
Sequence and Relationship levels is vastly improved when considering these standards 
together as opposed to individually.  For instance, a tourist to our nation‟s capitol may 
travel to the Russell Senate Office Building on a sightseeing expedition, a lobbyist may 
determine precisely where a Senator may be and at precisely what time, and an avid 
hunter may obtain weaponry, but it seems unlikely that any of these individuals poses a 
heighted risk of violence toward the Senator in question.  An individual who exhibits all 
of these behavioral standards, however, would pose a significantly greater risk. 
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Although there is no indication that control theory has influenced the development 
of threat assessment techniques to-date, there is considerably overlap between the guiding 
principles of threat assessment and the tenets of control theory.  Recall that from a threat 
assessment perspective, targeted violence is conceptualized as the end result of an 
understandable process of thinking and behavior.  This is also the case when targeted 
violence is examined from the perspective of control theory, only this latter perspective 
advances a well-defined self-regulatory mechanism by which comparisons between one's 
current state and one's behavioral standards elicit actions designed to reduce perceived 
discrepancies.  It could be argued that the provision of a specific mechanism with which 
to understand the process of thinking and behavior studied by threat assessment 
researchers would advance our understanding of targeted violence.  Also recall that from 
a threat assessment perspective, the planning and preparation in which the potential 
perpetrator engages is presumed to result in discrete, observable behaviors that betray the 
intention to engage in targeted violent behavior.  As stated above, achieving behavioral 
standards at the Sequence and Relationship levels of Power‟s (1973) hierarchy, which 
results in observable events, is necessary in order for an individual to achieve his or her 
superordinate goal, which may include targeted violent action.  Determination of the 
superordinate goal may be possible when these events are considered in relationship to 
each other. 
 While the overlap between control theory and threat assessment is fascinating, the 
novel insights that are gained when considering targeted violence within this theoretical 
context may significantly improve our ability to predict an individual‟s risk of engaging 
in such behavior.  For example, the influence of group opinions and attitudes on an 
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individual‟s risk for engaging in targeted violence may be better understood within the 
framework of control theory.  Drawing on Festinger‟s (1950, 1954) social comparison 
theory, Carver and Scheier (1981) note that individuals often seek out the opinions and 
attitudes of others for the purpose of determining a behavioral standard.  The authors go 
on to state: 
… [T]he theory assumes that ambiguity leads to a tendency to search out others 
and collate information gained from them (through either communication or 
observation).  The end product of this collaborative process is a consensually 
defined standard.  In the case of attitudes, the standard is the group‟s normative 
attitude. In the case of behavior, it is the behavior that the group appears to 
collectively deem appropriate to this time and place. This standard, then, will be 
used to guide one‟s subsequent verbalizations and actions. (p. 124) 
This may have striking implications for understanding the influence of extremist group 
ideologies and violent activism.  Individuals who affiliate themselves with extremist 
groups may adopt violent or destructive group principles as their own behavioral 
standards at the Principle level, or adopt violent or destructive actions committed by 
group members as their own behavioral standards at the Program or Sequence levels.  
This would be consistent with the phenomenon of so-called copycat crime (e.g., criminal 
action that is based upon the characteristics of previously publicized crimes), as well as 
the anecdotal increase in violent threats observed on the anniversaries of violent or 
extremist events.  Drawing upon the mass media literature, Surette (1990) reviewed 
incidents of copycat crime and despite noting a number of limitations in the extant 
literature at that time, he concluded that “copycat crime appears to be a persistent social 
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phenomena” (p. 97).  Surette (2002) later examined this phenomenon among violent 
juvenile offenders and found that one-fourth of the juveniles questioned reported that 
they had previously attempted to commit a copycat crime.  The relationship between 
extremist group affiliation and extremist actions, and threats and problematic approach 
behavior toward high-profile officials has received little attention, however, in the threat 
assessment literature. 
 The predictive utility of the content and language used in threatening 
communications may also be better understood within the framework of control theory.  
Sherman (1980) conducted a study in which he asked participants whether they would 
engage in specific behaviors if they were asked to do so at a later time.  At a later time, 
participants were again contacted and, in fact, asked to engage in the specific behavior 
that they had previously been polled about.  Results indicated that participants who 
predicted that they would engage in specific behaviors were more likely to do so than 
participants in a control condition who had not previously been asked to make a 
prediction.  This finding held true even when the behavior in question was not desirable 
to the person, such as writing a counterattitudinal essay or singing the Star-Spangled 
Banner over the telephone.  Carver and Scheier (1981) reasoned that “specifying a 
hypothetical intent may have made that intent salient as a behavioral standard” (p. 125), 
and that this increased salience resulted in later use of that behavioral standard.  In view 
of these findings, one might expect that threatening communications characterized by 
high specificity would be more predictive of problematic approach behavior than those 
characterized by low specificity.  Although this hypothesis has not been tested, the 
findings of Dietz and his colleagues (1991a, 1991b) demonstrating that evidence of 
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having constructed a plan of action (e.g., providing a time, date, or place that an approach 
would occur) seem to support the above assertion. 
 Analysis of the degree to which self-focus is evident in inappropriate and 
threatening communications may also improve the prediction of subsequent problematic 
approach behavior.  As stated above, self-focus precipitates the comparison of one‟s 
current state and relevant behavioral standards, leading the individual to engage in 
behaviors that minimize the discrepancy between the current state and the goal state.  It 
might, therefore, be expected that the authors of communications characterized by a high 
degree of self-focus would be more likely to behave in a manner consistent with the 
standards explicated within the communication.  Prior research has demonstrated that the 
use of first-person pronouns does increase as a function of increased objective self-
awareness (Davis & Brock, 1975), lending a degree of empirical support to this 
hypothesis. 
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Chapter 2 - Purpose and Specific Hypotheses 
 The targeted violence knowledge base has grown considerably over the past 
decade due to empirically sound research examining this phenomenon across a range of 
contexts, and the techniques used by threat assessment professionals have been 
significantly refined.  Without testable theory regarding the process by which an 
individual comes to regard violent action toward some target as an acceptable means to 
resolve some problem, however, the threat assessment community will be limited in their 
ability to adapt existing research findings to novel perpetrators, environments, and 
targets.  The purpose of the present research is examine the predictive utility of several 
proposed risk factors for targeted violence and problematic approach behavior toward 
members of the United States Congress that are based upon Carver and Scheier's (1981) 
control theory, and that have been previously unexamined in the threat assessment and 
targeted violence literature.  With this purpose in mind, the present research is designed 
to examine the following hypotheses: 
1. The degree of similarity between the content of threatening or inappropriate 
contacts and the literature and writings of known extremist groups that support 
violent or otherwise criminal action will be a significant predictor of problematic 
approach behavior, both between-persons and within-person, such that increased 
similarity will predict increased risk of problematic approach. 
2. Temporal proximity to anniversaries of notable violent incidents or violent or 
otherwise criminal action consistent with extremist group ideologies known to 
support violent or otherwise criminal action will be a significant predictor of 
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problematic approach behavior, both between-persons and within-person, such 
that increased temporal proximity will predict increased risk of problematic 
approach. 
3. Specification or evidence of a plan to engage in problematic approach behavior 
will be a significant predictor of problematic approach behavior, both between-
persons and within-person, such that increased specificity or detail will predict 
increased risk of problematic approach. 
4. The degree of self-focus evident in the content of threatening or inappropriate 
contacts will be a significant predictor of problematic approach behavior, both 
between-persons and within-person, such that increased self-focus will predict 
increased risk of problematic approach. 
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Chapter 3 - Methods 
 In an effort to enhance the generalizability of the proposed research to previous 
empirical work, the following definitions will be employed: Problematic approach will 
henceforth refer to an attempted or actual appearance at the grounds of the United States 
Capitol, at a Congressional office, or at another location where members were present 
and a member was the target, during which the subject engages in threatening or 
harassing behaviors.  Target will henceforth refer to the person or persons toward whom 
the subject's threatening or harassing behavior are directed, or to the person or persons 
who incidentally become involved in the subject's actions (e.g., congressional staff, 
USCP officers).  Case will henceforth refer to the entirety of documented contact and 
approach behaviors enacted by an individual subject toward any USCP protectees. 
Sample 
 The sample for this study will be randomly drawn from the population of subjects 
who have engaged in threatening or otherwise inappropriate contact toward members of 
the United States Congress and have subsequently been investigated by the Threat 
Assessment Section (TAS) of the USCP.  As noted by Scalora et al. (2002a; 2002b), the 
USCP is responsible for the safety and security of members of both the United States 
House of Representatives and the United States Senate, congressional staff, visitors to the 
Capitol grounds, and congressional offices throughout the nation.  Having been 
established in 1828, the USCP is one of the oldest law enforcement agencies with 
significant protective responsibilities.  The TAS is specifically responsible for performing 
investigative and risk assessment activities in response to threatening or suspicious 
activity involving Congressional members, or which occur on Capitol grounds (including 
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the Capitol building proper and office buildings), Congressional district offices, the 
residences of Congressional members, or at public events where a Congressional member 
is present. 
   In the absence of any prior literature suggesting an effect size for the variables of 
greatest interest, Cohen‟s (1989) conventional definition of a small effect size, d = .20, 
was used in the power analysis to determine the sample size for the proposed research.  
Based upon this effect size and a statistical significance level of .05, a sample size of 192 
subjects (96 individuals who engage in problematic approach behavior, 96 individuals 
who do not engage in such behavior) will be targeted in order to achieve a statistical 
power of .80. 
 Procedure  
 Subject characteristics, characteristics of problematic approach behavior, and 
characteristics of threatening and inappropriate contact toward Congressional members 
were extrapolated from investigative records maintained by the USCP TAS.  These 
records consist of information from a variety of sources, including interviews with the 
subject, interviews with third parties (e.g., subject acquaintances and family members, 
witnesses), and any written correspondence from the subject.  Formally analyzing the 
reliability of information contained within TAS records was not logistically possible in 
the proposed research for a variety of reasons, including the tremendous resources such 
an analysis would necessarily entail.  As has been the case in prior threat assessment 
research, however, variables selected for study inclusion were those for which highly 
reliable corroborating sources were typically available.  As noted in Baumgartner (2004), 
TAS cases are subject to review by supervisory staff trained in investigative techniques 
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devised for targeted violence risk assessment, techniques which, as previously noted, 
stress the importance of collecting information from multiple sources.  Investigators of 
the TAS receive specialized training on evaluative techniques to determine the presence 
of psychiatric symptomatology previously shown to be predictive of violent behavior, so-
called threat / control-override symptoms (e.g., Link & Stueve, 1994).  Both the 
aforementioned techniques and the internal review mechanism ensured a high level of 
reliability of this data. 
 In order to minimize reliability issues among variables central to the guiding 
hypotheses of this research, written contacts, including postcards, letters, facsimiles, e-
mails, pamphlets, and any text-based enclosures or attachments to those contacts (e.g., 
magazine or newspaper clippings) were electronically scanned.  Optical Character 
Recognition (OCR) software, ABBYY PDFTransformer, was used to convert contact 
materials from ink-and-paper to electronic text files (.txt files) for further analysis.  Self-
focus was operationalized as the density of first-person pronouns appearing in contact 
materials authored by the subject.  Utilizing the Practical Extraction and Report 
Language (Perl) computer programming language, the total word length was divided by 
the number of first-person pronouns (e.g., “I,” “me,” “my”).  In an effort to avoid the 
potential variance introduced as a function of the differences with regard to the verbosity 
of subjects, a secondary self-focus variable was extrapolated as the ratio of first-person 
pronouns and second- and third-person pronouns (e.g., “you,” “they,” “them”). 
 The degree of similarity between the content of threatening or inappropriate 
contacts and the literature and writings of known extremist groups was determined using 
a pseudo-Bayesian statistical approach.  A number of advantages of using such an 
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approach have been noted.  Filters designed using Bayesian principles have been 
previously shown to properly classify messages with a false negative rate of less than one 
percent and no false positive errors (Graham, 2004). Furthermore, the use of a naïve 
Bayes classifier in which the assumptions underlying Bayes theorem are relaxed, 
allowing for interdependent message properties to be treated as independent properties, 
has been shown to result in highly unexpected efficiency (Zhang, 2004).  In order to 
avoid the logistical difficulties inherent to processing extremist group literature and 
writings that are composed in non-English languages, only domestic extremist groups 
were considered.  An electronic compilation of writings attributed to domestic extremist 
groups identified by the Southern Poverty Law Center and listed on their website were 
used to construct a corpus of writings.    A naïve Bayesian filter was created using the 
Perl computer programming language and based upon the programming syntax presented 
by Graham (2004), a probability estimate was computed (e.g., the probability that a 
communication is consistent with extremist group writings).  The probability estimate 
was used intended to be used in later analyses of problematic approach behavior.  
Although it was initially intended that probability estimated would be estimated 
separately for several different groups (e.g., the probability that a communication is 
consistent with Ku Klux Klan writings, separate from the probability that a 
communication is consistent with the Army of God), significant similarity in language 
used between groups precluded such an approach.  As such, writings from the internet-
based extremist group, stormfront.org, was used as the sole source of extremist group 
writings. 
 The temporal proximity of problematic approach behavior to violent or otherwise 
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criminal action consistent with extremist group ideologies occurring elsewhere in the 
United States was determined using a small sample of notable incidents of extremist 
violence, including the Ruby Ridge incident, the Columbine school shooting incident, 
September 11
th
, and the Oklahoma City Bombing / Waco siege.  Temporal proximity was 
computed in days for all subjects. 
 Specification or evidence of a plan to engage in problematic approach behavior 
was determined based upon the presence of explicit details indicative of such planning.  A 
scaled variable was extrapolated based upon the presence or absence of the following 
details: a physical setting (e.g., Congressional district office), temporal setting (e.g., a 
specific date or time frame), behavioral intent (e.g., “... to consummate our love ...”), and 
other miscellaneous details relevant to approach.  One point was assigned for the 
presence of each of the aforementioned factors. 
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Chapter 4 - Analytical Methods 
Model Specification 
 A series of logistic multilevel models were estimated using SAS PROC 
GLIMMIX in order to determine the model, based on both substantive and statistical 
considerations, that best explains the relationship between the predictor variables 
identified above and problematic approach behavior.  At a basic level, the mixed model 
can be thought of as being composed of two separate models, a within-person (level-one) 
model and a between-persons (level-two) model.  Using an example with variables of 
interest in the present research, the within-person model (below) examines problematic 
approach behavior for a given individual i at time t (Approach behaviorti) as a function of 
the individual intercept (B0i) and the individual effect of within-person variation in self-
referential language (B1i).  Although the dependant variable in a linear mixed model 
varies also a function of a time specific residual (eti), the time specific residual is not 
estimated in the type of logistic mixed models estimated herein. 
Level 1: Approach behaviorti = B0i + B1i(Self-referential languageti – Mean self-
referential languagei) 
The between-persons model (below) examines problematic approach behavior for 
a given individual (B0i) as a function of the fixed intercept (γ00), the main effect of 
person-mean self-referential language (centered at zero; γ01), and a random intercept for 
the individual (U0i).  The individual effect of within-person variation in self-referential 
language (B1i) is, in turn, a function of the main effect of within-person self-referential 
language (centered around the individual‟s mean; γ10). 
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Level 2: B0i = γ00 + γ01(Mean self-referential languagei – 0)  + U0i 
 B1i = γ10 
As case files are not generated on a regular interval, there is little logical reason to 
expect variances and covariances to change predictably with time.  As such, random 
effects of time were not examined. 
Although the separate treatment within-person and between-persons effects of a 
predictor upon a chosen outcome may seem overly complicated, an example may 
illustrate that this methodology is not as complicated as it appears at first glance.  
Consider an individual who has written five e-mails to his Congressperson, resulting in 
the assignment of five separate cases by the USCP TAS.  If our interest is in examining 
this individual‟s use of self-referential language in the e-mails he authored, we may 
calculate his use of first-person pronouns (a common representation of such language) in 
each e-mail and take the average.  Our author‟s average use of first-person pronouns is a 
between-persons, or level-two, representation of self-referential language, because it 
represents his average use and may be compared to the average use of other individuals 
who contact their Congressperson.  This would allow us to answer the question, “Is an 
individual who generally uses a lot of self-referential language in their communications 
more likely to engage in problematic approach behavior?” 
  We may also be interested, however, in comparing the individual‟s use of self-
referential language in a given e-mail to his use in the other e-mails he has written.  Our 
author‟s use of first-person pronouns in each e-mail is a within-person, or level-one, 
representation of self-referential language, because it represents his use on a single 
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occasion and may be compared to his use on other occasions that he has written.  This 
would allow us to answer the question, “Is an individual who uses more self-referential 
language in their communications than is usual for that individual more likely to engage 
in problematic approach behavior?” 
  Disregard of the time-specific residual may be viewed as an inherent limitation of 
logistic mixed modeling, but one that is unavoidable in the present research; the outcome 
of interest, problematic approach behavior, is dichotomous in nature and cannot be 
examined using the general linear model.  Assumptions of the general linear model 
regarding normality (e.g., that level-one errors are normally distributed) and 
heteroscedasticity (e.g., that the level-one residual variance is constant over varying 
values of the predictors) cannot be met with binary outcome data, as errors are forced to 
take one of two values based upon the observed outcome minus the predicted outcome.  
Additionally, the variance is dependent upon the predicted probability of approach.  
Generalized linear modeling addresses these problems through use of the logit link 
function, which applies a logistic transformation to binary outcome data.  This results in a 
continuous distribution of possible outcome values that will result in an estimated 
predicted probability between zero and one. 
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Figure 2 
An illustration of logistic transformation of dichotomous outcome data in the generalized linear model 
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Estimation of a dichotomous outcome in the general linear 
model results in predicted values that cannot be interpreted 
(shown in the shaded areas) 
 
Logit transformation in the generalized linear model restricts 
predicted probability between 0 and 1 (exclusive), allowing 
possible logit outcome values to range between -∞ and +∞
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The use of an identity link function (as is the case in the general linear model) results in a 
discrete range of possible predicted outcome values that will result in a predicted 
probability between zero (e.g., the outcome did not occur) and one (e.g., the outcome did 
occur), with predicted outcome values outside that range generating estimates that cannot 
be logically interpreted.  Generalized linear models circumvent the aforementioned 
violations of normality and homoscedasticity assumptions by making different 
assumptions; that errors follow a Bernoulli distribution with a known residual variance of 
3.29. 
Subjects were eligible for sample inclusion from the population of subjects for 
whom the USCP maintains case files if they ever authored a threatening or otherwise 
inappropriate communication toward a protectee of the USCP. 
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Chapter 5 - Results 
 A total of 506 subjects were included in the present analyses.  Eighty-nine 
subjects (17.59%) could not be identified on the basis of their communication toward 
their target; demographic information was unavailable for these subjects.  Examination of 
the 417 subjects who could be identified revealed an average age of approximately 47 
years (SD = 14.26) at the time of their first contact with the USCP.  Over 83% (n = 364) 
of subjects were male.  Approximately 82% (n = 364) of subjects for whom ethnicity was 
known were Caucasian and approximately 11% were African-American.  Fewer than 25 
total subjects were classified as Hispanic, Asian, Middle Eastern, Native American, or 
“Other.”  The number of cases (e.g., files opened by the USCP following a behavior of 
concern by the subject) per subject ranged from 1 to 19 (M = 2.01, SD = 2.27), while the 
number of contacts (e.g., separate communications authored by the subject) per case 
ranged from 1 to 42 (M = 1.95, SD = 3.11) among the 611 cases with at least one contact. 
Of the total subjects included in these analyses, 70 subjects (13.92%) engaged in 
physical approach behavior at some time prior to their most recent investigation by the 
USCP.  For the purpose of the present research, however, only physical approach co-
occurring with USCP case activity can be considered, as any outcome variable in a mixed 
model must be observable at level-1.  A subset of 47 subjects (9.29% of the total sample) 
engaged in one or more occasions of such observed approach behavior (that is, approach 
behavior that coincided with a USCP case entry). 
 Visual inspection of histograms representing the distribution of scores on the 
non-transformed level-1 predictor variables (e.g., prior to calculating the deviation from 
the corresponding person-level means, as discussed below) was carried out to determine 
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the most useful representation of these variables.  The maximum percentage of total 
pronouns that are first-person pronouns and temporal proximity to anniversaries of 
domestic incidents of extremist violence both approximated a continuous, normal 
distribution, well-suited to analysis as linear variables.  Average (mean) Bayesian 
classifier score per case was neither continuous, nor normally distributed, however, with 
approximately 60% of values equal to zero and approximately 20% of values equal to 
one.  Based on this distribution, average (mean) Bayesian classification score per case 
was transformed into a dichotomous variable representing scores as falling above or 
below 0.5.  Similarly with regard to contact specificity, an overwhelming number of cases 
contained no specific details regarding planned approach or problematic behavior, 
resulting in a distribution of scores best suited for representation as a dichotomous value 
(e.g., no specific details regarding plans v. some details regarding plans).   
Descriptive statistics for predictor variables are presented below.  The maximum 
percentage of total pronouns in the first-person from any typed or written communication 
within an individual case averaged 52% (M = 52.21, SD = 26.47).  Such communications 
were reported to the USCP an average of 37 days (M = 37.40, SD = 29.95) from the 
closest of four anniversaries of domestic incidents, identified in the section above, of 
extremist violence.  Transformation of the Bayesian classification score into a 
dichotomous variable as outlined above resulted in 15.73% of cases containing at least 
one contact that received a score of 1, and 27.08% of subjects ever having authored a 
contact that received a score of 1.  Transformation of contact specificity into a 
dichotomous variable as outlined above resulted in 15.42% of subjects having authored a 
contact with one or more specific details regarding a threatened approach.  Descriptive 
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and distributional statistics of subject and content characteristics can be found in Table 4. 
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Table 4 
Univariate analyses of approach and non-approach samples 
 
Characteristic 
 Group 
N Approach  Non-approach 
 
Age (SD) 375 46.58 (11.55)  47.83 (14.73) 
Gender     
     Male 353 39  314 
     Female 72 6  66 
Race / Ethnicity     
     European-decent 305 38  267 
     African-decent 37 5  32 
     Hispanic 6 2  4 
     Asian 9 0  9 
     Middle Eastern 6 0  6 
     Native American 1 0  1 
Number of cases (SD) 506 4.81 (4.05)  1.72 (1.78) 
Content Factors 
Maximum first-person pronoun usage 
(SD) 
422 64.28 (19.46)  51.44 (26.18) 
Temporal proximity to anniversary of 
violent extremist incident (SD) 
492 39.99 (18.45)  36.98 (27.80) 
Ever authored a communication similar to 
extremist writings 
    
     Yes 137 11  126 
     No 369 36  333 
Inclusion of one or more specific details 
regarding planned approach 
    
     Yes 76 12  64 
     No 417 33  384 
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In an effort to provide a richer context within which to interpret the results of the 
logistic multilevel models presented below, descriptive statistics were generated 
separately for groups defined as having engaged in problematic approach behavior or not 
having engaged in such behavior (i.e., a between-persons analysis).  With regard to 
sample characteristics, individuals who engaged in problematic approach were 46.58 (SD 
= 11.55) years of age at the time their first case was assigned and had an average of 4.81 
(SD = 4.05) assigned cases, whereas individuals who did not engage in problematic 
approach were 47.83 (SD = 14.73) years of age at the time their first case was assigned 
and had an average of 1.72 (SD = 1.78) assigned cases.  While the difference in ages 
between these groups was not significant, t(373) = 0.55, p = ns, individuals who engaged 
in approach behavior did have significantly more assigned cases, t(504) = -9.64, p < 
.0001.  Neither the distribution of ethnicity, Χ2 (5, N = 364) = 4.74, p = ns, nor gender, Χ2 
(1, N = 425) = 0.47, p = ns, of subjects significantly differed as a function of whether or 
not they had engaged in problematic approach behavior. 
With regard to the predictors of interest, individuals who engaged in problematic 
approach averaged a maximum proportion of first-person pronouns to total pronouns of 
64.28 (SD = 19.46).  This was a significantly greater use of self-referential language than 
individuals who did not approach (M = 51.44, SD = 26.18), t(420) = -2.75, p < .01.  
Temporal proximity to anniversaries of domestic incidents of extremist violence did not 
differ between individuals who approached and those who did not, averaging 39.99 (SD = 
18.45) days and 36.98 (SD = 27.80) days respectively, t(490) = -0.72, p = ns. The 
distribution of individuals who had ever authored a communication with a Bayesian 
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classification score of 1 was also not significant between the groups, Χ2 (1, N = 506) = 
0.35, p = ns.  The dichotomous representation of contact specificity, however, differed as 
a function of whether the individual had ever engaged in problematic approach such that 
individuals who had engaged in approach behavior were more likely to include specific 
details in their communications, , Χ2 (1, N = 493) = 4.81, p = .03.   
Separate unconditional means models were estimated in order to determine the 
relative between- and within-person variation in the outcome and predictor variables 
across all recorded USCP cases.  The intraclass correlation (ICC) for the percentage of 
total pronouns in the first-person revealed that approximately 37% of the observed 
variation was between-persons (approximately 63% was within-person).  The ICC for the 
dichotomous representation of Bayesian classification scores indicating similarity to 
known extremist writings revealed that 50% of the observed variation in these scores was 
between-persons.  It must be noted that there is no exact equivalent of the ICC for logistic 
mixed level models given that the residual variance is not estimated, as described in the 
Analytic Method section.  Therefore, ICCs based upon variances estimated in logistic 
mixed level models (i.e., Bayesian classification scores, problematic approach behavior) 
should be interpreted cautiously with this caveat in mind.  The ICC for temporal 
proximity (in days) to anniversaries of notable domestic incidents of extremist violence 
revealed that only 7% of observed variation was between-persons (approximately 93% 
was within-person).  Finally, the ICC for the outcome of interest, problematic approach 
behavior, revealed that approximately 68% of observed variation was between persons 
(approximately 32% was within-person).  The substantial proportion of within-person 
variation among the predictors in this study justifies the proposed multilevel analytic 
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methodology. 
In order to examine the separate between- and within-person effects of self-
referential language and temporal proximity to anniversaries of domestic incidents of 
extremist violence, separate variables were created for later use in sequential models.  
Between-persons effects of the maximum percentage of total pronouns in the first-person 
and temporal proximity to anniversaries of domestic incidents of extremist violence were 
represented by calculating the mean values of the percentage of total pronouns that were 
first-person pronouns and the temporal proximity to anniversaries of domestic incidents 
of extremist violence respectively, across cases for each subject.  Within-person effects of 
these variables were represented by calculating the deviation from the corresponding 
person-level means.  Representing between- and within-person effects of variables in this 
manner is useful for predictors that do not change systematically over time.  The within-
person effect of Bayesian classifier score was represented by the dichotomous variable 
described above.  In an effort to determine how best to represent the incremental 
between-persons effect of this predictor (e.g., the effect of the between-persons 
representation of Bayesian classifier score after controlling for the within-person effect), 
a histogram representing the distribution of Bayesian classifier scores across cases per 
subject was visually inspected.  This supported a dichotomous representation at the 
between-persons level as well, where subjects were classified as having no scores 
indicative of similarity to extremist group writings, or having at least one score indicative 
of such similarity. 
Among individuals for whom multiple case files had been created by the USCP, a 
substantial number of observations resulted in which data extrapolated from the 
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communication were missing.  This occurred when a case contained no faxed, mailed, or 
e-mailed communication authored by the subject.  Given the nested design of this study, 
the effect of missing data was considered both within-person and between-persons.  At 
level-one (e.g., within-person), cases were characterized as containing missing data for 
communication-related predictors or not.  At level-two (e.g., between-persons), subjects 
were characterized as containing missing data for communication-related predictors 
across all subjects cases or having such data in at least one case.  The presence of data in 
at least one case would allow for the inclusion of level-two data.  In an effort to identify 
potential bias that may result from the inclusion of large amounts of missing data, two 
series of models were estimated for the affected predictors: self-referential language and 
similarity to extremist group writings.  In the first series, models were estimated using 
predictors in which missing values were unchanged, and thus cases with missing 
predictors were removed from analysis.  In the second series, models were estimated 
using data in which missing values were transformed into zero values, and these 
transformed predictors were entered as an interaction with a predictor representing 
whether the data was missing in the original data at level-one and level-two, along with 
the predictor representing whether the data was missing as an individual term.  Using the 
formulae above, this method of addressing missing data can be represented as: 
Level 1: Approach behaviorti = B0i + B1i(Self-referential language case data 
missingnessti) + B2i(Self-referential languageti – Mean self-referential 
languagei)(Self-referential language case data missingnessti) 
Level 2: B0i = γ00 + γ01(Self-referential language subject data missingnessi)  + 
γ01(Mean self-referential languagei – 0)(Self-referential language 
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subject data missingnessi)  + U0i 
 B1i = γ10 
In these formulae, “case data missingness” refers to whether communication-related 
predictor data was missing for an entire case, while “subject data missingness” refers to 
whether communication-related predictor data was missing across all cases for an entire 
subject.  Although there was no difference in patterns of significance between 
corresponding models in the two series, logit effects and odds ratio estimates were 
reported from the models in which missing values were transformed into zero values to 
avoid selection bias.  In circumstances in which missing values appear systematically due 
to some unidentified, yet non-random, effect, sample selection bias may affect the 
validity and generalizability of the results.  Thus, transformation of missing values into 
zero values was deemed the most prudent course of action. 
Self-Focus and Problematic Approach Behavior 
 It was originally hypothesized that greater self-focus on average, as well as 
greater self-focus than usual for the individual, would correspond to an increased 
likelihood of problematic approach behavior.  Using self-referential language as a proxy 
for self-focus, a model was estimated in which the between- and within-person effects of 
data missingness were included as separate parameters, as well as the interaction of these 
parameters with between- and within-person effects of self-referential language.  Results 
from this model indicate that the expected logit of problematic approach among 
individuals for whom no typed or written contacts were available is -3.34 (SE = 0.60, p < 
.0001), corresponding to a probability of problematic approach of 0.03.  The availability 
of one or more contacts within any case file assigned to the subject corresponds with a 
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decrease in the expected logit of 2.56 (SE = 1.04, p = .01) for all cases assigned to a 
subject and probability of problematic approach of less than 0.01.  The availability of one 
of more contacts within a given case file corresponds with a further decrease in the 
expected logit of 1.02 (SE = 0.44, p = .02) for that specific case and probability of 
problematic approach of 0.01.  Stated simply, in the present study both the availability of 
contact data within a given case and within any case assigned to a subject corresponds 
with a decrease in the probability of problematic approach behavior.  Despite the 
statistical significance of the predictors representing the nature of missingness in this 
data, the interpretation of these variables is problematic due to the multifarious causes of 
such missingness.  As a result, meaningful interpretation of these predictors is difficult.  
This may suggest, however, that the mere act of authoring and sending an inappropriate 
or threatening communication decreases the risk of problematic approach, consistent with 
the well-documented finding that those who make threats often pose little threat of 
approach. 
Among subjects for whom contact data is available, greater overall use of self-
referential language (e.g., between-persons) results in an overall increase in the expected 
logit of 0.03 (SE = 0.01) for each one percent increase in the percentage of total pronouns 
in the first-person, implying a greater probability of engaging in problematic approach 
behavior, F(1,498) = 6.08, p = .01.  By way of example, for each ten percent increase in 
the percentage of total pronouns in the first person, the odds of engaging in problematic 
approach behavior (versus not engaging in approach behavior) increase by a factor of 
1.288.  Greater than usual use of self-referential language for the subject (e.g., within-
person) results in an increase in the expected logit of 0.01 for that case for each one 
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percent increase in the percentage of total pronouns in the first-person, although this does 
not represent a significant increase in the probability of problematic approach, F(1,482) = 
0.22, p = ns.  The effect of self-referential language, as well as the predictors reviewed 
below, on problematic approach behavior across subjects is shown in Table 5.  
68 
Table 5 
 
Generalized linear model parameter estimates 
 
 
Self-referential language 
Parameter Logit SE Odds ratio p-value 
Intercept -3.34 0.60 - <.0001 
Level-1 data present -1.02 0.45 .359 .02 
Level-2 data present -2.56 1.04 .296 .01 
Person-mean centered first-person 
pronoun use 
0.01 0.02 1.06
1
 .64 
Mean first-person pronoun use 0.03 0.01 1.29
1 
.01 
 
Similarity of contact to known extremist group writings 
Parameter Logit SE Odds ratio p-value 
Intercept -3.35 0.60 - <.0001 
Level-1 data present -0.98 0.51 0.36 .05 
Level-2 data present -0.79 0.71 0.49 .27 
Contact similarity – Individual case -0.31 0.75 0.83 .68 
Contact similarity – Any case 0.24 0.72 1.21 .74 
 
Temporal proximity to anniversary of notable extremist violence 
Parameter Logit SE Odds ratio p-value 
Intercept -5.1315 0.73 - <.0001 
Length in days – Individual case -0.01 0.01 0.99 .28 
Shortest length in days – Any case 0.01 0.01 1.01 .31 
 
Specification of a plan 
Parameter Logit SE Odds ratio p-value 
Intercept -5.1028 0.64 - <.0001 
Specification of one or more 
details 
1.10 0.63 3.00 .08 
 
                                                 
1
 Odds ratio for a ten percent increase are shown for ease of interpretability 
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Similarity of Contacts to Known Extremist Group Writings and Problematic Approach 
Behavior 
 It was originally hypothesized that the greater similarity between the content of 
threatening or inappropriate contacts and the writings of known extremist groups on 
average, as well as greater similarity than usual for the individual, would correspond to 
an increased likelihood of problematic approach behavior.  Using Bayesian classification 
scores as a proxy for similarity, a model was estimated in which the between- and within-
person effects of data missingness were included as separate parameters, as well as the 
interaction of these parameters with between- and within-person effects of mean 
Bayesian classification score.  Among subjects for whom contact data is available, high 
similarity to known extremist writings in any contact authored by subject (e.g., between-
persons) results in an overall increase in the expected logit of 0.24 (SE = 0.72), while 
high similarity to known extremist writings in a contact in a given case file (e.g., within-
person) results in a decrease in the expected logit of 0.31 (SE = 0.75) for that case.  The 
magnitude of these changes, however, does not achieve statistical significance (F[1,503] 
= 0.11, p = ns, F[1,486] = 0.17, p = ns, respectively). 
Temporal Proximity to Anniversaries of Notable Extremist Violence and Problematic 
Approach Behavior 
It was originally hypothesized that closer temporal proximity to anniversaries of 
notable extremist incidents for each case, as well as temporal proximity averaged across 
all cases, would correspond to an increased likelihood of problematic approach behavior.  
Having chosen four contemporary incidents from which to calculate the shortest period of 
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time between incident and case assignment, a model was estimated in which between- 
and within-person effects of temporal proximity were entered as predictors.  As noted in 
the Analytical Methods section, it was unnecessary to include parameters representing 
data missingness in this model as temporal proximity was determined from the date on 
which a case was created.  As such, the absence of contacts authored by the subject did 
not result in missing data as in the models above.  Results from this model indicate that 
for each case file belonging to a subject (e.g., within-person), the expected logit of 
problematic approach for that case decreases 0.008 (SE = 0.007) for each additional day 
between the date the case was opened and a noted anniversary date.  Examination of the 
shortest time period between the date a case was opened and a notable anniversary date 
across all cases assigned to a subject (e.g., between-persons), the expected logit of 
problematic approach increases 0.01 (SE = 0.01) for each additional day.  Neither the 
within- or between-persons predictors in this model achieved statistical significance, 
however (F[1,416] = 1.19, p = ns, F[1,490] = 1.02, p = ns, respectively). 
Specification of a Plan to Approach and Problematic Approach Behavior 
It was originally hypothesized that increased specification of a plan to engage in 
problematic approach behavior would correspond to an increased likelihood of 
problematic approach behavior.  To test this hypothesis, a model was estimated in which 
the between-persons effect of contact specificity was included as the sole predictor.  As 
data regarding contact specificity was available only for the most recent case assigned to 
a subject, within-person examination of this predictor could not be performed.  Results 
from this model indicate that the inclusion of at least some detailed specification of a plan 
to engage in problematic approach corresponds to an increase of 1.10 (SE = 0.63) in the 
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expected logit of problematic approach.  An increase of this magnitude approached 
statistical significance (F[1,491] = 3.07, p = .08).  Characterized differently, a subject 
who included at least a single detail regarding their plan to engage in problematic 
approach behavior was three times more likely to actually engage in problematic 
approach behavior than subjects who did not include such details. 
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Chapter 6 - Discussion 
In building a case for the importance of this dissertation, it is suggested that the 
development of an improved understanding of why a particular individual pursues a 
violent resolution to some perceived injustice or problem would have major implications 
for the assessment of targeted violence and its prevention.  As a starting point, the 
hypotheses tested in the current research were based on Carver and Scheier‟s (1981) 
control theory, which, despite its wide acceptance in the psychology literature, has not 
been applied to this issue of targeted violence.   The results presented here are a modest, 
initial step toward developing that understanding. 
Primary Analyses 
It was hypothesized that use of self-referential language, as a representation of 
self-focus, would predict problematic approach behavior.  In the present study, the use of 
self-referential language was demonstrated to be significantly related to problematic 
approach behavior such that high use of such language on average predicted that an 
individual is more likely to engage in approach behavior on average.  Variation in a 
subject‟s use of self-referential language across communications, however, was unrelated 
to problematic approach.  These findings have clear bearing upon the identification-
related goals of threat assessment.  The ability to garner threat-relevant information from 
subject communications would undoubtedly aid law enforcement and protective 
intelligence personnel in the early identification of individuals who may possess and 
increase proclivity to approach their target, consistent with the first of Fein et al.‟s (1995) 
four components in identifying potential perpetrators (e.g., the development of criteria 
that would trigger the initiation of a threat assessment investigation).  Prior research, for 
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example, has demonstrated that content characteristics such as the presence of help-
seeking requests (Scalora et al., 2002a) and absence of articulated threats (Scalora et al., 
2002b) are predictive of problematic approach among individuals who author concerning 
correspondence to congressional members.  Additional research findings, such as the 
higher incidence of problematic approach among individuals who write threatening 
letters as opposed to e-mail (Schoeneman-Morris et al., 2007) and who contact multiple 
congressional targets as opposed to contacting a single congressperson (Scalora et al., 
2002a), demonstrate that both the content of the communication as well as the manner in 
which an individual communicates may inform the development of criteria for initiating a 
threat assessment investigation.  The present finding that use of self-referential language 
is predictive of problematic approach adds to this growing body of empirically-derived 
criteria. 
Whereas the utility of this finding upon the identification of individuals who may 
engage in problematic approach behavior is not in question, the bearing of this finding on 
assessment-related goals is less clear.  As stated above, the relationship between self-
referential language and problematic approach behavior in the current research was 
observed only in the between-person analyses; the relationship was not significant in the 
within-person analyses.  Said differently, variations in an individual‟s use of self-
referential language over time did not predict approach toward a Congressional target, it 
was, rather, the individual‟s average use of self-referential language across all known 
contacts that predicted approach.  The threat assessment approach is premised upon the 
notion that violence is a process and that individuals move “toward or away from an 
attack” (Fein et al., 1995, p. 5).  This movement toward or away from an attack is 
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evidenced by the individual‟s thoughts and behaviors.  A logical extension of this premise 
to the behavior of interest would predict that the likelihood of problematic approach 
would increase with corresponding increasing use of self-referential language across an 
individual‟s communications.  That prediction was unsupported in this research.  
Although the use of self-referential language across all contacts was a significant 
predictor, the individual contact characterized by this use was often not the approach-
related contact. 
In control theory, self-focus plays an important role in motivating an individual to 
achieve their goals through the comparison of one‟s current situation and their desired 
situation (Carver and Scheier, 1981).  Although research linking self-focus and help-
seeking behavior is currently lacking, it stands to reason that help-seeking inherently 
invokes self-focus in that one must recognize how their current state of affairs differs 
from their desired state of affairs in order to make a request for help.  When so 
conceptualized, the finding that greater use of self-referential language, a common proxy 
for self-focus, is consistent with the findings of Scalora et al. (2002a) that subjects 
engaging in problematic approach behavior toward members of Congress were more 
likely to author communications with help-seeking motives. 
Extensions of cybernetic theories of action control such as control theory have 
great potential to help us better understand the relationship between self-focus and 
targeted violence.  Central to Carver and Scheier‟s (1981) control theory is the idea that 
self-regulation is a process resulting from self-directed attention comparing an 
individual‟s current state to their desired state, and the behaviors that minimize the 
discrepancy between those states.  Muraven, Tice, and Baumeister (1998) were among 
75 
the first to conceptualize self-regulation as a limited resource, “akin to having a limited 
supply of strength or energy” (p. 774).  In a series of studies, they demonstrated that self-
control was impaired by various types of prior exertion, including the suppression of 
forbidden thoughts (e.g., cognitive suppression).  In a separate series of studies, 
Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, and Tice (1998) demonstrated similarly that the 
suppression of forbidden affect (e.g., affective suppression) also resulted in impaired self-
control.  In both studies, the authors termed this phenomenon ego depletion. 
Recall from the introduction the rationale behind the hypothesis that individuals 
who demonstrated high self-focus would be more likely to engage in problematic 
approach: self-focus precipitates comparison of one‟s current state and relevant 
behavioral standards, making approach behavior more likely when one‟s behavioral 
standards involve approach.  This is consistent with the significant between-persons 
relationship discussed above.  Ego depletion may explain why a significant within-person 
relationship was not observed.  Baumeister and Exline (1999, 2000) make a compelling 
argument that moral, virtuous behavior is the direct result of self-control, “insofar as 
virtue depends on overcoming selfish or antisocial impulses for the sake of what is best 
for the group or collective” (p. 1165).  By extension, the loss of self-control by way of 
ego depletion would result in immoral behavior and, perhaps, problematic approach 
behavior.  This is not to characterize problematic approach behavior as unplanned or 
impulsive.  Rather, problematic approach behavior and targeted violence may be 
characterized as a planned immoral behavior. 
Ego depletion as a causal mechanism for problematic approach may also help 
explain the relationship between mental illness and problematic approach of political 
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figures in federal government (Scalora et al., 2002a, 2002b).  If we accept the notion that 
symptoms of mental illness consume limited self-regulation resources, it follows from 
that deficits in self-regulation may result antisocial behavior, such as problematic 
approach and targeted violence.  Recent research by DeWall, Baumeister, Stillman, and 
Gailliot (2007) supports this explanation.  In a series of five studies, they demonstrated 
that depleted capacity for self-regulation due to ego depletion increased aggressive 
responding.  Their research builds on earlier research suggesting that deficits in self-
control may serve as the basis for a general theory of crime (Longshore & Turner, 1998). 
It was hypothesized that similarity to known extremist writings would predict 
increased problematic approach behavior.  Analyses revealed no significant relationship 
between these variables.  In formulating the hypothesis that increased similarity between 
known extremist writings and inappropriate and threatening communications toward 
Congressional targets would predict increased approach behavior, it was believed that 
increased similarity would reflect increased influence of extremist group opinions and 
attitudes upon the subject.  Taken a step further, the influence of extremist group opinions 
and attitudes upon an individual represents the type of environmental characteristics 
believed to facilitate violent action that, along with characteristics of the perpetrator and a 
stimulus or “triggering condition” (Fein et al., 1995, p. 3), comprise the factors thought to 
result in targeted violence.  This hypothesis was unsupported in the current research, 
although the reason it was not supported is in question.  It may be that extremist group 
opinions and group attitudes have a minimal influence upon an individual‟s intention to 
engage in violent actions toward a targeted individual affiliated with the United States 
Congress.  While this may seem unlikely based upon the innumerable historical examples 
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of individuals acting violently and endorsing some group ideology, it is important to 
recognize that there are countless others who endorse the same ideology but nevertheless 
choose some variation of non-violent action.  Further support for the possibility that 
extremist group ideologies have a minimal influence upon the decision to engage in 
targeted violence can be found in the ECSP (Fein & Vossekuil, 1999); among the eight 
motives for attack behaviors, extremist group action is notably absent.  It is worth 
reiterating that the ECSP studied targeted violence directed toward protectees of the 
USSS, and that motives behind such actions toward different target groups are known to 
vary. 
There are additional possible explanations for a non-significant finding between 
similarity of subject communications to known extremist group writings and approach 
behavior.  It may be that the manner in which similarity to extremist group writings was 
operationalized in this study failed to capture the aspects of similarity important for 
approach.  As outlined above, extremist group writings were obtained from an internet-
based discussion board belonging to one of the largest white nationalist groups in 
existence.  Polling writings for text analysis from internet-based resources is not without 
precedent in the area of text analysis; in their study of linguistic markers of psychological 
change surrounding the attacks of September 11, 2001, Cohn, Mehl, and Pennebaker 
(2004) downloaded the diaries of 1,084 United States users of an on-line journaling 
service.  The topics of extremist group writings were surprisingly diverse, and included a 
large number of conversations that were remarkable in that they contained little or no 
extreme content.  This would have resulted in calculated probabilities for token words of 
questionable generalizability to writings that espouse typical extremist ideologies. 
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One additional explanation for the failure to reject the null hypothesis regarding 
similarity of subject communications to extremist group writings and problematic 
approach behavior is that the nature of largely internet-based groups does not exert the 
same influence upon individuals as groups that physically gather.  Although this 
possibility has not been examined in the context of extremist groups, there is literature to 
suggest that the phenomena associated with social compliance differs between online and 
face-to-face groups (Cinnirella & Green, 2007).  In one of the earliest contributions to 
this literature, Kiesler, Siegel, and McGuire (1984) reported that participation, group 
decisions, and interaction among members were significantly different in computer-
mediated groups.  Spears, Lea, and Lee (1990) later reported that the effects of de-
individuation on group polarization using a computer-mediated communication system 
were similar to those observed in face-to-face groups.  A fair review of this literature 
reveals mixed results, and stops short of addressing the pertinent issue for this research. 
It was hypothesized that increased specification or evidence of a plan to engage in 
problematic approach behavior would predict such behavior.  This hypothesis was 
marginally supported in the relationship between increased contact specificity and 
approach, in that results of these analyses approached statistical significance at the .05 
significance level.   In formulating this hypothesis, it was thought that specification of a 
plan would increase the salience of the author‟s intentions.  Within the context of the 
threat assessment literature, however, increased specification of a plan to engage in 
problematic approach behavior may be conceptualized as a manifestation of the discrete, 
observable behaviors demonstrating an individual‟s intention to engage in targeted 
violent action, which the astute reader will recognize as the third of three fundamental 
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principles outlined by several threat assessment researchers.  Data regarding contact 
specificity could be obtained on only one contact per subject and was therefore treated 
solely as a between-person variable. 
It was hypothesized that temporal proximity to notable incidents of extremist 
violence would be related to problematic approach behavior.  This relationship was not 
observed in the present study.  There are several limitations inherent to the current 
operationalization of temporal proximity, however, that may explain the absence of this 
relationship in the present study.  As noted in the Methods section, temporal proximity 
was calculated as the number of days between the date a USCP case file was opened and 
the closest anniversary date of an incident of extremist violence.  The date a USCP case 
file may differ substantially from the date the author wrote the communication; this latter 
date holds far greater relevance for temporal proximity.  Factors affecting this difference 
may include delays in transit time between the subject and the letter‟s intended recipient, 
delays by the recipient in reading the communication after receiving it, and delays by the 
recipient in reporting the communication to the USCP.  These factors may have 
introduced considerable variance into the analysis of temporal proximity, resulting in the 
observed non-significant results.  Unfortunately, the aforementioned delays are difficult 
to control in cases that include written communications. 
The hypothesis that temporal proximity to notable incidents of extremist violence 
would be inversely related to problematic approach behavior was based upon the belief 
that individuals who affiliate themselves with extremist groups may adopt violent or 
destructive group principles, as well as violent or destructive actions committed by like 
others, as their own behavioral standard.  An additional limitation inherent to the current 
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operationalization of temporal proximity lies in the inability to identify which incidents 
of extremist violence are notable for the individual.  For example, an individual angry 
about perceived abuses of constitutional liberties by federal law enforcement may view 
the anniversary of the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building as a highly 
salient date due to ideological commonalities between the individual and Timothy 
McVeigh.  Alternatively, the anniversary of the 1999 shooting at Columbine High School 
may hold little salience for that individual.  Although the decision to use the nearest 
anniversary date was an attempt to use the most salient anniversary date, it is unclear 
what effect this limitation had on these analyses. 
In their review of construal level theory, Trope and Liberman (2003) discuss the 
implications of that theory for temporal changes in evaluation, prediction, and choice.  
Construal level theory shares fundamental assumptions with control theory regarding 
goal-directed action, specifically in the presumption that superordinate goals are 
translated into subgoals as the time of implementation nears.  These authors contend that 
an individual‟s representation of plans become more concrete, and include more 
contextual and incidental details, as time to a future event diminishes.  This line of 
reasoning provides additional theoretical support from a slightly different perspective that 
is, nevertheless, grounded partially in the principles underlying control theory. 
Despite the best efforts for the researchers involved in collecting the data used in 
the current research and utilizing a statistical methodology that minimizes the influence 
of missing data, the only conclusion that can drawn with certainty is that the hypotheses 
advanced herein were, with two notable exceptions, largely unsupported in this data.  It 
cannot be determined with more than a modest degree of certainty whether the failure to 
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find a significant relationship between problematic approach behavior and temporal 
proximity, as well as similarity between the contact and known extremist literature, is due 
to the large proportion of missing data, or due to a weak relationship between the 
outcome variable and these predictors. 
Implications 
Beyond the significant findings of the current research, this project has a number 
of practical implications for threat assessment practices.  As law enforcement and 
protective intelligence personnel make greater use of database storage systems, and 
constituents make greater use of e-mail and web-based methods of contact, the potential 
exists for designing and implementing automated systems of detecting anomalous 
contacts based on empirically-derived criteria.  In addition to providing a more 
sophisticated, data-driven, and comprehensive method to identify concerning 
communications, it also potentially provides a solution to an even greater problem for 
both the research and practice of threat assessment: the selective referral of cases by 
Congressional staff members.  Although many congressional staff receive training in the 
identification of communications and situations characterized by an increased risk of 
problematic behavior, communications containing more subtle risk indicators that would 
nonetheless be of concern to a threat assessment professional may go unnoticed or 
unreferred.  Acknowledging that the automated forwarding of communications meeting 
empirically-derived criteria to threat assessment personnel would likely constitute an 
insurmountable breech of the confidentiality of Congressional communications, an 
electronic screening system that alerts Congressional staff that a communication has met 
such criteria would likely go a long way toward resolving the problem of selective 
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referral. 
Outside of the practical implications of these methodologies for the threat 
assessment of subjects who engage in inappropriate behavior toward members of 
Congress, they may have some relevance for predicting approach in cases of stalking.  In 
their comprehensive review of the stalking literature, Cupach and Spitzberg (2004) 
identified a cluster of distinguishable stalking behaviors which they termed “mediated 
contacts.”  They defined these behaviors as “all forms of communication efforts 
performed through technologies, including email, IM, the Internet, PDAs, cellphones, 
faxes, pagers, and the like” (Spitzberg & Cupach, 2007, p. 71), and characterized so-
called “cyber-stalking” as a type of stalking exemplified by the intrusive use of these 
types of communications.  In light of the results of several studies demonstrating that 
cyber-stalking and physical stalking overlap in some proportion of cases (Alexy, Burgess, 
Baker, & Smoyak, 2005; Finn, 2004; Spitzberg & Hoobler, 2002), predictors of approach 
from electronic communications and a means by which to quickly obtain that information 
has the potential to improve violence prevention in cases of stalking.  Many of the cases 
included for study in the present research did not include the behaviors listed above, 
however, and much additional research is necessary to determine the implications and 
generalizability of these findings to the phenomenon of cyber-stalking.  
In some of the earliest published threat assessment research, Fein and Vossekuil 
(1999) stated that, “those who pose threats frequently do not make threats” (p. 14).  As 
stated previously, however, the author of this dissertation contends that written 
communications offer what is perhaps the richest source of information regarding threat-
relevant cognitions and behaviors that are directly attributable to the subject.  James 
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Pennebaker, one of more well-known researchers in the area of text analysis, commented 
that, “The way people use words convey a great deal of information about themselves, 
their audience, and the situations they are in” (p. 548).  Furthermore, the analysis of 
communications authored by subjects to determine the presence or absence of 
psychological factors such as mental illness and negative emotionality help the threat 
assessment professional avoid reliance on the judgment of untrained third parties. Further 
underscoring the importance of studying the communications that precede or coincide 
with problematic approach behavior is the prevalence of intrusive communications 
concomitant with stalking (Spitzberg & Cupach, 2007) and other problematic approach 
behavior.  Although the application of threat assessment techniques to stalking was 
intentionally omitted from the preceding review of threat assessment literature due to the 
relatively modest treatment of stalking behavior in the threat assessment literature, 
predictors of problematic approach based upon communication characteristics may be 
especially relevant when considering that over 50% of stalking cases are estimated to 
include some use of threat (Spitzberg & Cupach, 2007).  The incidence of violence 
toward targeted individuals has been shown to be quite high, as well, with 32% of 
stalking cases involving physical violence and 12% involving some sexual violence 
(Spitzberg & Cupach).  Thus, the implications of the current research for cases of stalking 
is discussed with the caveat the current sample contained a limited number of cases 
containing stalking behavior, and additional research is necessary to determine the 
implications and generalizability of this research to the phenomenon of stalking.  
Despite the modest, non-significant relationship observed between the similarity 
of threatening and otherwise inappropriate communications to known extremist writings 
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and problematic approach behavior, the potential ideological motivations of individuals 
who attempt to engage in targeted violence will likely be of increasing scrutiny among 
threat assessment professionals.  In recent years, one may observe with a sense of 
concern the increase in the violent activities of fringe militia groups and members of 
ideological movements.  In 2010, for example, after the public listing of a home address 
purportedly belonging to a USCP protectee on a web blog belonging to a Tea Party 
activist, alongside a message encouraging readers to “stop by,” the gas line to the home 
was cut, leading law enforcement officials to conclude, “… investigators do believe that 
the leaking gas could have posed a danger if there had been an ignition source” (Cooper, 
2010).  In an unrelated incident occurring within one week of the above incident, nine 
members of a right-wing militia group calling themselves Hutaree were arrested after 
planning to kill a targeted law enforcement officer and bomb the funeral procession using 
improvised explosive devices (Bunkley & Savage, 2010). 
It must be noted that the findings of prior studies have been mixed with regard to 
the importance of ideological beliefs as a motivational factor in targeted violence and 
problematic approach.  Whereas ideological motives did not play a significant role in 
attacks upon USSS protectees, Calhoun (1998) reported that such motives were 
significant in attacks upon the federal judiciary.  Assuming that similarity to known 
extremist group writings is a suitable proxy for the strength with which extremist ideals 
are internalized, it may be the case that these ideals are unlikely predictors of approach 
against Congressional targets, but are likely predictors of approach against other targeted 
groups. 
The results of this study have questionable implications for use in school-based 
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threat assessment.  The characteristics identified by Fein et al. (2002) in the USSS School 
Safety Initiative in many ways minimize the utility of these findings, even if they are 
generalizable to this younger population.  Student attackers were largely found not to 
have threatened their targets directly, and their motives were not ideologically-based and 
help-seeking was not identified as a possible motive.  While these characteristics suggest 
limited implications for school-based threat assessment, the greater use of electronic 
communications among younger individuals may provide a more comprehensive source 
of communications from which to draw information and make threat predictions.  And 
while empirical research on so-called copycat school violence has been limited, Dewey 
Cornell, whose research on school-based violence has been extremely influential, was 
quoted as stating that, “Attention is part of [the issue of copycat school violence], 
attraction to notoriety, but [also] the suggestive power of the event and some desire to 
share in that kind of event or to be part of that” (Dechter & Bowie, 2006).  While 
temporal proximity to notable acts of extremist violence was not a significant predictor of 
problematic approach toward USCP protectees, it may act as a significant predictor of 
approach among school students who possess different motives for their actions. 
There is one final comment regarding the implications of the current research that 
must be made.  However rich or informative an individual‟s communications, they are 
only one form of behavior that an individual can perform.  A subject‟s communications 
must be interpreted within the larger context of the subject‟s life circumstances and their 
ability to pose a threat to the target.  A subject may author a communication characterized 
by every known communication related risk factor, but if that subject is serving a life 
sentence in a federal correctional facility, their risk of engaging in targeted violence 
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toward the target may nonetheless be considered to be quite low. 
Directions for Future Research 
Despite the wide use of problematic approach behavior as a proxy variable for 
targeted violence, it is not without issue in research intended to further our knowledge of 
the cognitions and behaviors that precede acts of targeted violence.  As mentioned above, 
problematic approach behavior is an outcome is highly relevant for law enforcement and 
protective intelligence personnel, as it is often the last step at which intervention may 
occur before an actual violent act.  Calhoun‟s (1998) finding that communication or the 
delivery of communication requiring close physical proximity to the targeted was more 
likely to result in violent or enhanced risk outcomes supports this assertion.  But the 
quality of problematic approach considered strictly from the standpoint of its 
appropriateness as an outcome variable in empirical research suffers from the 
heterogeneity of behaviors it describes.  By way of example using cases included in the 
present sample, an unarmed, homeless individual living in a park less than one mile from 
the Russell Capitol building entered the office of a Congressperson to inquire about the 
theft of personal information, a belief related to the subject‟s mental illness.  While a 
heightened potential for violence certainly exists in that case, the character of the 
approach behavior is remarkably different from a second case in which an armed 
individual who traveled across several states and was apprehended by law enforcement 
personnel within a building in which the targeted Congressperson was within.  While this 
latter case necessarily involved an increased degree of planning and preparation which 
would have resulted in identifiable risk-relevant behaviors, the prior case would have 
resulted in far fewer of such behaviors.  As can be plainly inferred, the main issue with 
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the use of problematic approach behavior as a dichotomous outcome variable in threat 
assessment research is the variability in risk posed by the subject that is unaccounted for 
due to the heterogeneity of behavior falling within this broad category. 
Future threat assessment research may benefit from an ordinal, rather than 
dichotomous, representation of problematic approach behavior.  Characterization of the 
outcome in this manner would allow for useful distinctions to be drawn among 
problematic approach behaviors that vary in the potential for lethality, as well as other 
characteristics relevant for the intended end users of this research in the law enforcement 
community. 
A literature review conducted by Pennebaker, Mehl, and Niederhoffer (2003) on 
the methodologies and findings of research examining natural language use outlines 
several important avenues for future research development.  Gottschalk (1997), for 
example, summarizes a well-developed approach for accurately determining psychiatric 
syndromes through content analysis.  Applied to threatening communications, this 
approach, if successful, could provide an empirically-sound method for determining if the 
author suffers from mental illness.  As mental illness has been repeatedly demonstrated to 
be factor relevant to approach (see Scalora et al., 2003, for example), this would be 
especially useful in situations which the subject‟s mental health cannot be formally 
assessed by trained professionals.  Additionally, Pennebaker et al. (1990) discussed an 
approach for assessing a concept the authors termed “levels of thinking” from both verbal 
and written language use.  In that levels of thinking are closely related to coping with 
stressors, this approach may be relevant for assessing a subject‟s ability to cope well with 
a significant stressor or alternatively, engage in problematic approach or targeted 
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violence. 
Despite the relative recency of empirical efforts toward understanding the 
phenomenon of targeted violence, it is a behavior that dates back centuries to ancient 
Rome, and will likely persist well into the future.  The extant threat assessment literature 
has greatly advanced our understanding and efforts at prevention of this behavior.  
Without greater integration of theory into this area of study, however, progress toward the 
development of new techniques and even deeper understanding may be slowed.  This 
dissertation is offered as a small step toward that integration. 
89 
 
References 
Adams, S. J., Hazelwood, T. E., Pitre, N. L., Bedard, T. E., & Landry, S. D. (2009). 
Harassment of members of Parliament and the legislative assemblies in Canada by 
individuals believed to be mentally disordered. Journal of Forensic Psychiatry & 
Psychology, 20, 801-814. doi:10.1080/14789940903174063 
Allen, K., Cornell, D., Lorek, E., & Sheras, P. (2008). Response of school personnel to 
student threat assessment training. School Effectiveness and School Improvement, 
19, 319-332. doi:10.1080/09243450802332184 
Alexy, E. M., Burgess, A. W., Baker, T., & Smoyak, S. A. (2005). Perceptions of 
cyberstalking among college students. Brief Treatment and Crisis Interventions, 5, 
279-289. doi:10.1093/brief-treatment/mhi020 
Baumeister, R. F., Bratslavsky, E., Muraven, M., & Tice, D. M. (1998). Ego depletion: Is 
the active self a limited resource? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
74, 1252-1265. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.74.5.1252 
Baumeister, R. F., & Exline, J. J. (1999). Virtue, personal, and social relations: Self-
control as the moral muscle. Journal of Personality, 67, 1165-1194. 
doi:10.1111/1467-6494.00086 
Baumeister, R. F., & Exline, J. J. (2000). Self-control, morality, and human strength. 
Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 19, 29-42. 
Baumgartner, J. V. (2004). Protective security cases: An examination of characteristics 
related to multiple approach contact behavior toward the U.S. Congress. 
Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Nebraska-Lincoln. 
90 
Baumgartner, J. V., Scalora, M. J., & Plank, G. L. (2001). Case characteristics of threats 
toward state government targets investigated by a Midwestern state. Journal of 
Threat Assessment, 1, 41-60. doi:10.1300/J177v01n03_023 
Borum, R. (2000). Assessing violence risk among youth. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 
56, 1263-1288. doi:10.1002/1097-4679(200010)56:10<1263::AID-
JCLP3>3.0.CO;2-D 
Borum, R., Fein, R., Vossekuil, B., & Berglund, J. (1999). Threat assessment: Defining 
an approach for evaluating risk of targeted violence. Behavioral Sciences and the 
Law, 17, 323-337. doi:10.1002/(SICI)1099-0798(199907/09)17:3<323::AID-
BSL349>3.0.CO;2-G 
Bunkley, N., & Savage, C. (2010, March 29). Militia charged with plotting to murder  
officers. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com 
Burns, M. K., Dean, V. J., & Jacob-Timm, S. (2001). Assessment of violence potential 
among school children: Beyond profiling. Psychology in the Schools, 38, 239-247. 
doi:10.1002/pits.1014 
Calhoun, F. S. (1998). Hunters and howlers: Threats against the federal judiciary in the 
United States, 1789-1993. (USMS Publication No. 80). Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Justice. 
Calhoun, F. S. (2001). Violence toward judicial officials. The Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, 576, 54-68. 
doi:10.1177/0002716201576001005 
Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. (1981). Attention and self-regulation: A control-theory 
approach to human behavior. New York: Springer-Verlag. 
91 
Cicchetti, D. V., & Sparrow, S. A. (1981).  Developing criteria for establishing interrater 
reliability of specific items: Applications to assessment of adaptive behaviors. 
American Journal of Mental Deficiency, 86, 127-137. 
Cinnirella, M., & Green, B. (2007). Does „cyber-conformity‟ vary cross-culturally? 
Exploring the effect of culture and communication medium on social conformity. 
Computers in Human Behavior, 23, 2011-2025. doi:10.1016/j.chb.2006.02.009 
Coggins, M. H., Pynchon, M. R., & Dvoskin, J. A. (1998). Integrating research and 
practice in federal law enforcement: Secret Service applications of behavioral 
science expertise to protect the President. Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 16, 51-
70. doi:10.1002/(SICI)1099-0798(199824)16:1<51::AID-BSL293>3.0.CO;2-B 
Coggins, M. H., Steadman, H. J., & Veysey, B. M. (1996). Mental health clinicians‟ 
attitudes about reporting threats against the President. Psychiatric Services, 47, 
832-836. 
Cohen, J. (1989). Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences (2
nd
 ed.). 
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Cohn, M. A., Mehl, M. R., & Pennebaker, J. W. (2004). Linguistic markers of 
psychological change surrounding September 11, 2001. Psychological Science, 15, 
687-693. doi:10.1111/j.0956-7976.2004.00741.x 
Cooper, M. (2010, March 25). Accusations fly between parties over threats and 
vandalism. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com 
Cornell, D. G. (2003). Guidelines for responding to student threats of violence. Journal of 
Educational Administration, 41, 705-719. doi:10.1108/09578230310504670 
Cornell, D., & Sheras, P. (2006). Guidelines for responding to student threats of violence. 
92 
Longmont, CO: Sopris West. 
Cornell, D., Sheras, P., Gregory, A., & Fan, X. T. (2009). A retrospective study of school 
safety conditions in high schools using the Virginia Threat Assessment Guidelines 
versus alternative approaches. School Psychology Quarterly, 24, 119-129. 
doi:10.1037/a0016182 
Cornell, D. G., Sheras, P. L., Kaplan, S., McConville, D., Douglass, J., Elkon, A., et al. 
(2004). Guidelines for student threat assessment: Field-test findings. School 
Psychology Review, 33, 527-546. 
Cupach, W. R., & Sptizberg, B. H. (2004). The dark side of relationship pursuit: From 
attraction to obsession and stalking. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Davis, D., & Brock, T. C. (1975). Use of first person pronouns as a function of increased 
objective self-awareness and prior feedback. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 11, 381-388. doi:10.1016/0022-1031(75)90017-7 
de Becker, G. (1998). The gift of fear: Survival signals that protect us from violence. New 
York: Little Brown. 
Dechter, G., & Bowie, L. (2006, October 3). Copycat crime can feed more violence. The 
Baltimore Sun. Retrieved from http://www.baltimoresun.com 
DeWall, C. N., Baumeister, R. F., Stillman, T. F., & Gailliot, M. T. (2007). Violence 
restrained: Effects of self-regulation and its depletion on aggression. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 43, 62-76. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2005.12.005 
Dietz, P. E., Matthews, D. B., Martell, D. A., Stewart, T. M., Hrouda, D., R., & Warren, J. 
(1991). Threatening and otherwise inappropriate letters to members of the United 
States Congress. Journal of Forensic Sciences, 36, 1445-1468. 
93 
Dietz, P. E., Matthews, D. B., Van Duyne, C., Martell, D. A., Parry, C. D., Stewart, T., et 
al. (1991). Threatening and otherwise inappropriate letters to Hollywood 
celebrities. Journal of Forensic Science, 36, 185-209. 
Duval, S., & Wicklund, R. A. (1972). A theory of objective self-awareness. New York: 
Academic Press. 
Ewing, C. P. (1999). Introduction to threat assessment. Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 
17, 251-252. doi:10.1002/(SICI)1099-0798(199907/09)17:3<251::AID-
BSL353>3.0.CO;2-2 
Fein, R. A., & Vossekuil, B. (1998). Protective intelligence and threat assessment 
investigations: A guide for state and local law enforcement officials. (NIJ / OJP / 
DOJ Publication No. NCJ 170612). Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice. 
Fein, R. A., & Vossekuil, B. (1999). Assassinations in the United States: An operational 
study of recent assassins, attackers, and near-lethal approachers. Journal of 
Forensic Sciences, 50, 221-233. 
Fein, R. A., Vossekuil, B., & Holden, G. A. (1995). Threat assessment: An approach to 
prevent targeted violence. National Institute of Justice: Research in Action, 1-7. 
Fein, R. A., Vossekuil, B., Pollack, W. S., Borum, R., Modzeleski, W., & Reddy, M. 
(2002). Threat assessment in schools: A guide to managing threatening situations 
and to creating safe school climates.  Washington, DC: U.S. Secret Service & U.S. 
Department of Education. 
Festinger, L. (1950). Informal social communication. Psychological Review, 57, 271-282. 
doi:10.1037/h0056932 
Festinger, L. (1954). A theory of social comparison processes. Human Relations, 7, 117-
94 
140. doi:10.1177/001872675400700202 
Finn, J. (2004). A survey of online harassment at a university campus. Journal of 
Interpersonal Violence, 19, 468-483. doi:10.1177/0886260503262083 
Gottschalk, L. A. (1997). The unobtrusive measurement of psychological states and traits. 
In C.W. Roberts (Ed.), Text analysis for the social sciences: Methods for drawing 
statistical inferences from texts and transcripts (pp. 117-129). Mahwah, New 
Jersey: Erlbaum. 
Graham, P. (2004). A plan for spam.  In P. Graham, Hackers and painters: Big ideas from 
the computer age (pp. 121-129). Sebastopol, CA: O'Reilly Media. 
Hayes, S. C., Strosahl, K. D., & Wilson, K. G. (1999). Acceptance and commitment 
therapy: An experiential approach to behavior change. New York: The Guilford 
Press. 
Hoffman, J. L. (1943). Psychotic visitors to government offices in the national capital. 
American Journal of Psychiatry, 99, 571-575. 
James, D. V., Mullen, P. E., Meloy, J. R., Pathe, M. T., Farnham, F. R., Preston, L., et al. 
(2007). The role of mental disorder in attacks on European politicians 1990-2004. 
Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 116, 334-344. doi:10.1111/j.1600-
0447.2007.01077.x 
James, D. V., Mullen, P. E., Pathé, M. T., Meloy, J. R., Farnham, F. R., Preston, L., et al. 
(2008). Attacks on the British royal family: The role of psychotic illness. Journal of 
the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, 36, 59-67. 
Jenkins, D. (2001). The U.S. Marshals Service‟s threat analysis program for the 
protection of the federal judiciary.  The Annals of the American Academy of 
95 
Political and Social Science, 576, 69-77. doi:10.1177/0002716201576001006 
Kiesler, S., Siegel, J., & McGuire, T. W. (1984). Social psychological aspects of 
computer-mediated communication. American Psychologist, 39, 1123-1134. 
doi:10.1037/0003-066X.39.10.1123 
Kingery, P., Biafora, F., & Zimmerman, R. (1996). Risk factors for violent behaviors 
among ethnically diverse urban adolescents. School Psychology International, 17, 
171-188. doi:10.1177/0143034396172006 
Link, B. G., & Stueve, A. (1994). Psychotic symptoms and the violent / illegal behavior 
of mental patients compared to community controls.  In J. Monahan & H. Steadman 
(Eds.), Violence and mental disorder: Developments in risk assessment (pp. 137-
160).  Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Logan, W. S., Reuterfors, D. L., Bohn, M. J., & Clark, C. L. (1984). The description and 
classification of presidential threateners. Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 2, 151-
167. doi:10.1002/bsl.2370020205 
Longshore, D., & Turner, S. (1998). Self-control and criminal opportunity: Cross-
sectional test of the general theory of crime. Criminal Justice & Behavior, 25, 81-
98. doi:10.1177/0093854898025001005 
Melton, G., Petrila, J., Poythress, N. G., & Slobogin, C. (1997). Psychological evaluations 
for the courts: A handbook for mental health professionals and lawyers (2
nd
 ed.). 
New York, NY: Guilford. 
Monahan, J. (1981). The clinical prediction of violent behavior. Rockville, MD: NIMH. 
Mullen, P. E., James, D. V., Meloy, J. R., Pathe, M. T., Farnham, F. R., Preston, L., 
Darnley, B., et al. (2009). The fixated and the pursuit of public figures. Journal of 
96 
Forensic Psychiatry and Psychology, 20, 33-47. doi:10.1080/a4789940802197074 
Muraven, M., Tice, D. M., & Baumeister, R. F. (1998). Self-control as limited resource: 
Regulatory depletion patterns. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 
774-789. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.74.3.774 
National School Safety Center (1998). Checklist of characteristics of youth who have 
caused school-associated violent deaths. Westlake Village, CA: National School 
Safety Center. 
O'Toole, M. (February, 2000). The school shooter: A threat assessment perspective. 
Quantico, VA: Critical Incident Response Group, National Center for the Analysis 
of Violence Crime. 
Palarea, R. E., Zona, M. A., Lane, J. C., & Langhinrichsen-Rohling, J. (1999). The 
dangerous nature of intimate relationship stalking: Threats, violence, and associated 
factors. Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 17, 269-283. doi:10.1002/(SICI)1099-
0798(199907/09)17:3<269::AID-BSL346>3.0.CO;2-6 
Patrasso, C. J. (2005). Questions in the evaluation for threat assessment in schools. The 
Forensic Examiner, 14, 6-12. 
Pennebaker, J. W., Czajka, J. A., Cropanzano, R., Richards, B. C., Brumbelow, S., 
Ferrara, K., Thompson, R., & Thyssen, T. (1990). Levels of thinking. Personality 
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 16, 743-757. doi:10.1177/0146167290164014 
Pennebaker, J. W., Mehl, M. R., & Niederhoffer, K. G. (2003). Psychological aspects of 
natural language use: Our words, our selves. Annual Review of Psychology, 54, 
547-577. doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.54.101601.145041 
Phillips, R. T. (2006). Assessing Presidential stalkers and assassins. Journal of the 
97 
American Academy of Psychiatry and Law, 34, 154-164. 
Powers, W. T. (1973). Behavior: The control of perception. Chicago: Aldine. 
Pynchon, M. R., & Borum, R. (1999). Assessing threats of targeted group violence: 
Contributions from social psychology. Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 17, 339-
355. doi:10.1002/(SICI)1099-0798(199907/09)17:3<339::AID-BSL345>3.0.CO;2-
9 
Quinsey, V. L., Harris, G. T., Rice, M. E., & Cormier, C. A. (2006). Violent offenders: 
Appraising and managing risk (2
nd
 ed.). Washington, DC: American Psychological 
Association. 
Randazzo, M. R., Borum, R., Vossekuil, B., Fein, R., Modzeleski, W., & Pollack, W. 
(2006). Threat assessment in schools: Empirical support and comparison with other 
approaches. In S. R. Jimerson & M. J. Furlong (Eds.), Handbook of school violence 
and school safety: From research to practice (pp. 147-170). New York: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates. 
Reddy, M., Borum, R., Berglund, J., Vossekuil, B., Fein, R., & Modzeleski, W. (2001). 
Evaluating risk for targeted violence in schools: Comparing risk assessment, threat 
assessment, and other approaches. Psychology in the Schools, 38, 157-172. 
doi:10.1002/pits.1007 
Ryan-Arrendondo, K., Renouf, K., Egyed, C., Doxey, M., Dobbins, M., Sanchez, S., & 
Rakowitz, B. (2001). Threats of violence in schools: The Dallas Independent 
School District's response. Psychology in the Schools, 38, 185-196. 
doi:10.1002/pits.1009 
Salfati, C. G., & Canter, D. V. (1999). Differentiating stranger murders: Profiling offender 
98 
characteristics from behavioral styles. Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 17, 391-
406. doi:10.1002/(SICI)1099-0798(199907/09)17:3<391::AID-BSL352>3.0.CO;2-
Z 
Scalora, M. J., Baumgartner, J. V., & Plank, G. L. (2003). The relationship of mental 
illness to targeted contact behavior toward state government agencies and officials. 
Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 21, 239-249. doi:10.1002/bsl.525 
Scalora, M. J., Baumgartner, J. V., Zimmerman, W., Callaway, D., Maillette, M. A., 
Covell, C. N., et al. (2002a). An epidemiological assessment of problematic 
contacts to members of Congress. Journal of Forensic Sciences, 47, 1360-1364. 
Scalora, M. J., Baumgartner, J. V., Zimmerman, W., Callaway, D., Maillette, M. A., 
Covell, C. N., et al. (2002b). Risk factors for approach behavior toward the U.S. 
Congress. Journal of Threat Assessment, 2, 35-55. doi:10.1300/J177v02n02_03 
Scalora, M. J., & Callaway, D. F. (2000, August). Assessing threats toward the U.S. 
Congress: A large scale study. Paper presented at the Annual Threat Management 
Conference of the Association of Threat Assessment Professionals, Anaheim, CA. 
Schoeneman-Morris, K. A., Scalora, M. J., Chang, G. H., Zimmerman, W. J., & Garner, 
Y. (2007). A comparison of email versus letter threat contacts toward members of 
the United States Congress. Journal of Forensic Sciences, 52, 1142-1147. 
doi:10.1111/j.1556-4029.2007.00538.x 
Sebastiani, J. A., & Foy, J. L. (1965). Psychotic visitors to the White House. American 
Journal of Psychiatry, 122, 679-686. 
Serin, R. C. (1991). Psychopathy and violence in criminals. Journal of Interpersonal 
Violence, 6, 423-431. doi:10.1177/088626091006004002 
99 
Sherman, S. J. (1980). On the self-erasing nature of errors of prediction. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 39, 211-221. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.39.2.211 
Spears, R., Lea, M., & Lee, S. (1990). De-individuation and group polarization in 
computer-mediated communication. British Journal of Social Psychology, 29, 121-
134. 
Spitzberg, B. H., & Cupach, W. R. (2007). The state of the art of stalking: Taking stock of 
the emerging literature. Aggression and Violent Behavior, 12, 64-86. 
doi:10.1016/j.avb.2006.05.001 
Spitzberg, B. H., & Hoobler, G. D. (2002). Cyberstalking and the technologies of 
interpersonal terrorism. New Media & Society, 4, 71-92. 
doi:10.1177/14614440222226271 
Surette, R. (1990) Estimating the magnitude and mechanisms of copycat crime. In R. 
Surette (Ed.), The media and criminal justice policy: Recent research and social 
effects (pp. 87-101). Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas Publisher. 
Surette, R. (2002). Self-reported copycat crime among a population of serious and violent 
juvenile offenders. Crime and Delinquency, 48, 46-69. 
doi:10.1177/0011128702048001002 
Trope, Y., & Liberman, N. (2003). Temporal construal. Psychological Review, 110, 403-
421. doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.110.3.403 
Turner, J. T. & Gelles, M. G. (2003). Threat assessment: A risk management approach. 
Binghamton, NY: The Haworth Press. 
Vossekuil, B., Borum, R., Fein, R., & Reddy, M. (2001). Preventing targeted violence 
against judicial officials and courts. The Annals of the American Academy of 
100 
Political and Social Science, 576, 78-90. doi:10.1177/0002716201576001007 
Van Ness, P. H., O'Leary, J., Byers, A. L., Fried, T. R., & Dubin, J. (2004, May). Fitting 
longitudinal mixed effect logistic regression models with the NLMIXED procedure. 
Paper presented at the 29
th
 annual meeting of the SAS Users Group International, 
Montréal, Canada. 
Wang, E. W., & Diamond, P. M. (1999). Empirically identifying factors related to 
violence risk in corrections. Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 17, 377-389. 
doi:10.1002/(SICI)1099-0798(199907/09)17:3<377::AID-BSL351>3.0.CO;2-M 
Weiner, N. A., & Hardenbergh, D. (2001). Understanding and controlling violence 
against the judiciary and judicial officials.  The Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, 576, 23-37. doi:10.1177/0002716201576001003 
Zhang, H. (2004). The optimality of naïve Bayes.  In V. Barr & Z. Markov (Eds.), 
Proceedings of the 17
th
 International Florida Artificial Intelligence Research 
Society Conference, (pp. 562 - 567). Menlo Park, California: The AAAI Press. 
101 
APPENDIX A 
SAMPLE EXTREMIST GROUP WRITINGS FROM STORMFRONT.ORG 
102 
 
 “BEING BORN INTO THE NATION AND BEING VERY PROUD OF MY 
HERTIAGE, I FAIL TO SEE HOW A WHITE WOMAN CAN DEFLATE HERSELF TO 
SUCH A LOW LEVEL. IT IS WOMEN LIKE THESE WHO SCAR OUR RACE WITH 
THEIR STUPIDITY. WHAT A DISGRACE AND SLUR TO OUR RACE. I HAVE NO 
USE FOR THESE TYPES. IF THIS IS THEIR CHOICE, THEN IT IS BEST TO LEAVE 
THEM IN THE CESSPOOL THEY HAVE CHOSEN. THEY DO NOT EVEN 
DESERVE TO BE CONNECTED WITH THE SUPREME RACE!” 
 
“its not actually cormac..i firmly believe that the white race is better than the blacks for 
instance but i dont believe in divisions within our race,the irish arent better than the 
norwegians for instance and nor are the british better than us.” 
 
“I don't know if the the term „White Nationalist‟ was ever officially trademarked. The 
boundaries of the „White Nationalist movement‟ are difficult to draw even by those who 
consider themselves „White Nationalists‟. I think the same is true for any movement. The 
trend now for those who secretly hate white people is to make unfair and illogical 
comparisons between white activists who sincerely want to protect the white race and the 
mentally ill anarchists who want to commit a crime then play the race card. 
Is the Aryan Brotherhood part of the „White Nationalist movement‟? Ask Jesse Jackson if 
the blacks who attacked innocent whites and destroyed the city of Los Angeles after the 
Rodney King affair are part of the „Civil Rights movement‟. 
